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ABSTRACT 
 
ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL POLICY COORDINATION:  
TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICIES AND THE ROLE OF 
THE WTO 
 
BY 
 
GALINA BELOKUROVA 
 
The interrelationship between trade and competition policies is definitely unique 
when one realizes that both are concerned with trade. The difference lies in antitrust 
disciplines’ dealing with private firms as objects, while trade policy formulation is 
still a prerogative of a nation-state. Competition policy is concerned mostly with 
consumer welfare, while trade policy may be motivated in various ways: from 
maximizing national income and / or political economy considerations to using a trade 
agreement as an external pressure for dealing with conflicting domestic interest 
groups. In any case, the closeness of competition and trade policies has induced 
policy-makers to include provisions on competition into some of the WTO 
Agreements that are currently in force. Interestingly, despite all those differences in 
approach to trade enumerated above the existing trade theory has already incorporated 
the main assumptions of “structural competition” theory, which can be clearly 
illustrated by the WTO “competition policy” provisions. This approach, however, may 
appear to be biased as the Cordato’s “dynamic competition” vision suggests. 
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1 
INRODUCTION 
 
International policy coordination has long been in the center of scientific scrutiny 
because of its immutable importance. It is clear that policy choices produced by the 
governments can often cause adverse influences on their trading partners’ economic 
performance, thus all concerned parties call for closer international cooperation in 
order to avoid the transmission of negative externalities throughout the world 
economy. Moreover, not only government conduct could be a cause of national 
markets’ foreclosure: private behavior is now often perceived as such1.  
 
The lack of an adequately equipped international institution with strong capabilities to 
provide reliable enforcement had been impeding development of multilateral forum 
on international policy coordination for more than fifty years despite growing 
perception that there should be one. The problem is still unresolved. The emergence 
of the WTO in 1995, the first multilateral institution with routinely working dispute 
settlement mechanism, has provoked an increased interest of policy-makers, who tried 
to explore on the possibility to use similar “legalistic” approach in other areas. The 
possibility and desirability of the WTO dispute settlement’s usage in areas adjoining 
                                            
1 Eleanor Fox “Competition Law and the Millennium Round”, Journal of International Economic Law, 
665-679, 1999. 
2 
trade policy and potentially capable to influence it, has been among the issues raised 
by the public service community 2 . Nevertheless, very few works considered 
international policy coordination in its unity. Most commonly the interactions 
between trade, competition, environmental and labor policies are reckoned separately 
without appropriate consideration of connected policy realms.  
 
In author’s view, the most comprehensive theoretical framework developed thus far in 
the literature is presented in the works of Bagwell and Staiger 3 . A hypothesis 
                                            
2 The problem of international policy coordination is relatively new, but nevertheless, it has received a 
considerable attention. Among recent works in the field are Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, “Do
mestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and International Economic Institutions,” Quarterly Journal of E
conomics, May 2001, pp. 519-562; Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, “Competition Policy and the 
WTO”, NBER, first draft, 2001; Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, “Domestic Policies, National So
vereignty, and International Economic Institutions”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2001;  I
gnacio de Leon, “Should We Promote Antitrust in International Trade”, World Competition, December 
1998; Carmen Otero Garcia-Castrillon, “Private Parties under the Present WTO (Bilateralist) Competiti
on Regime”, Journal of World Trade 35 (1): 99-122, 2001; Richard Damania, Per G. Fredriksson, “Trad
e Policy Reform, Endogenous Lobby Group Formation and Environmental Policy”, Journal of Econom
ic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 52 (2003) 47–69; Roberto Burguet and Jaume Sempere, “Trade libera
lization, environmental policy, and welfare”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 46 
(2003) 25–37, Bernard Hoekman, “Competition Policy and Preferential Trade Agreements”, World Ban
k Working Papers, 2002; Bernard Hoekman, “Competition Policy and Global Trading System: A Devel
oping Country Perspective”, Policy Research Working Paper, 1735, World Bank, March 1997, Lee Mc
Gowan, “Protecting Competition in a Global Market: A Pursuit of International Competition Policy”, E
uropean Business Review Volume 98 · Number 6 · 1998 · pp. 328–339; Joel Davidow, “Antitrust Issues 
Arising Out of Actual or Potential Enforcement of Trade Laws”, Journal of International Economic La
w (1999), 681 – 693 and many others. 
3 Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, “Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and International 
Economic Institutions”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2001 
3 
developed by them was taken as a basis for critical research in this paper and the 
conclusion appears to be dubious with respect to the whole neoclassical and 
“structural” paradigm. 
 
Bagwell and Staiger made a special accent on the transmission of adverse policy 
effects within the global economic system, where the main tool appears to be relative 
world price. Standardization policies, which comprise equally environmental and 
labor standards, are, on the other hand, responsible for determining the elasticity of 
import supply to the home country4.  This essay argues, however, that there are other 
aspects of international trade system that may hardly be explained by this hypothesis 
and that are extensively investigated in the works of competition and trade lawyers, 
although in a qualitative fashion5.  
 
Most importantly, the focus on a “fixed” relative world price, which comes through 
reciprocal concessions of the Member governments and the obligation of non-
discriminatory treatment, implicitly suggests that governments should determine trade 
                                            
4 Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, “Competition Policy and the WTO”, NBER, first draft, 2001; 
Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, “Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and International 
Economic Institutions”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2001 
5 Joel Davidow “Antitrust Issues Arising out of Actual or Potential Enforcement of Trade Laws”, 
Journal of International Economics and Law, pp. 681-693, 1999 
4 
volumes (how else the unique relative world price could be attained?). However, as it 
was convincingly shown in EC - Oilseeds6, “the commitments they [governments] 
exchange in negotiations are commitments on conditions of competition for trade, 
not on volumes of trade”. This view was later upheld in the WTO jurisprudence as 
well in Japan – Film7 case.  
 
Granting concessions on trade volumes is an unattainable task for governments: 
economic forces determining trade flows are beyond any regulatory effort. In which 
particular way the trade flows will be structured depends not only on policy choices 
made by national governments, but mostly on the performance of private economic 
operators and their ability to compete. The economic model of the WTO proposed by 
Bagwell and Staiger is missing this part. On the other hand, this issue is widely 
discussed among policy-makers, for example, within the WTO Group on the 
Interaction between trade and Competition Policies8 in a more practical and legalistic 
way. 
 
                                            
6 EC – Oilseeds I (GATT), Report of the Panel, L/6627 – 37S/86, 25 January 1990, para. 150 
7  Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, Report of the Panel, 
WT/DS44/R, 31 March, 1998 
8 8 Eleanor Fox “Competition Law and the Millennium Round”, Journal of International Economic 
Law, 665-679, 1999. 
5 
Therefore, the main conclusion derived by Bagwell and Staiger that globally efficient 
policy choices could be achieved exclusively through selection of tariffs may be less 
general than it was claimed. The model therein implicitly implies that main objects of 
the international trade system are sovereign governments, nation-states, and only they 
can alter relative world price through their policy choices. In existing world economy, 
this is indeed not the case, and actual policy-makers clearly understand that. 
Theoretical explorations on interactions between trade and competition policies are 
falling far behind actual policy developments, and that might be one of the reasons 
why recent Cancun Ministerial failed to produce any kind of agreement. The analysis 
provided in this paper  
 
The main purpose of this paper is to evaluate the plausibility of more comprehensive 
policy coordination under the WTO focusing on “horizontal” interactions between 
trade and competition policies. Government policies, having a potential to generate 
cross-border externalities, may be roughly divided9 into the two big groups. The first 
group includes inherently domestic policies, which stay within the full discretion of 
national governments, and which form domestic economic environment.  
 
                                            
9 This kind of division is of course not absolute: it is presented here mostly for analytical purposes. 
6 
The second group comprises those, which are intended to regulate cross-border flows 
of people, money and goods. Policies from these groups would potentially differ in 
their influence on international trade. 
 
The first group definitely includes measures 10  that establish national standards 
(sanitary, technical, environmental, and labor), the level of intellectual property 
protection, industrial, fiscal policy and “domestic” part of investment policies 11 . 
Violations, nullification or impairment caused by externalities generated by the 
policies of this group are likely to involve in the first place Article III (National 
Treatment), Article XI (The General Prohibition of Quantitative Restrictions), Article 
X (Transparency), also Article I (MFN)12, and some other more specific provisions. 
All those cases fit the Bagwell and Staiger’s model. 
 The second group of policies accommodates those contemplated to regulate cross-
border flows of people, financial resources and goods and presumably include the 
control over the state of national accounts (monetary policy), as well as migration 
policy, trade policy, and “outer” part of investment policy. Competition13 or antitrust 
                                            
10 The definition of “a measure”: any effective governmental action, whether legally binding or not. 
11 Strategic export subsidies, infant industry protection and “industrial targeting”, for example 
12 In the context of access to the domestic market together with Article XIII (Non-discriminatory 
Administration of Quantitative Restrictions) 
13 In accordance with European (competition) and American (antitrust) definitions 
7 
policies’ location is somehow intermediate in the proposed classification. On the one 
hand, antitrust policies have been ever perceived and are still considered as domestic 
regulations, the main purpose of which is to protect consumer welfare. Even today in 
many countries including some Members of the European Union, export cartels that 
harm consumer welfare outside national borders, are exempt from the coverage of the 
national antitrust laws, which prohibit horizontal price fixing in general14.  
 
Recent developments and globalization of world economy have made private 
economic operators influential enough to affect world prices independently mostly 
through TNC activities. Those powerful forces make nation-states impinged by 
uncontrolled dynamics of the world marketplace. Thus, governments are still capable 
to negotiate reciprocal and non-discriminatory agreements, but the real-life market 
situation concurrently strongly depends on the patterns of private conduct. This is the 
basic reason, why some Member-countries in the WTO are so much concerned with 
the problem of devising some internationally accepted antitrust rules, in particular 
concerning the hard core cartels15.  
 
                                            
14  Phedon Nicolaides, “Competition Policy in the Process of Economic Integration”, World 
Competition, December 1998, pp. 117 - 139 
15 EC represents the most notorious promoter of this vision.  
8 
Common concern, however, does not mean that there exists any shared vision on 
appropriate competition policies. Even the prohibition of hard core cartels and export 
cartels is not considered as the common place in antitrust policy. In fact, as the United 
States allied with EC on the issue of competition policy’s introduction into the current 
(Doha Round) WTO negotiating agenda, the failure of Cancun Ministerial showed 
that it was obviously a premature movement.  
 
Definitely, export subsidies were not the only reason, why Cancun Conference failed 
to produce an agreement: the EU's insistence on negotiating in new areas such as 
investment rules and competition policy also had a detrimental effect. Finally, in 
seeking to woo developing countries, Washington has distanced itself from the EU by 
calling for elimination of export subsidies and for shelving or dropping competition 
and investment policies agenda16. Although the EU offered at the Cancun Ministerial 
to ditch its demands for competition and investment rules, it has since appeared 
reluctant to abandon them altogether.  
 
The interrelationship between trade and competition policies is definitely unique 
when one realizes the simple fact that both are concerned with trade. The difference 
                                            
16 Financial Times, January 12 2004 
9 
lies in antitrust disciplines’ dealing with private firms as objects, while trade policy 
formulation is still a prerogative of a nation-state. Competition policy is concerned 
mostly with consumer welfare, while trade policy may be motivated in various ways: 
from maximizing national income and / or political economy considerations to using a 
trade agreement as an external pressure for dealing with conflicting domestic interest 
groups. In any case, the closeness of competition and trade policies has induced 
policy-makers to include provisions on competition into some of WTO Agreements 
that are currently in force.17 Interestingly, despite all those differences in approach to 
trade enumerated above the existing trade theory has already incorporated the main 
assumptions of “structural competition” theory, which can be clearly illustrated by the 
WTO “competition policy” provisions listed below. This approach, however may 
appear to be biased. 
 
“Competition policy provisions” include: 
1. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, which contains detailed rules 
regulating the adoption of technical regulations and conformity assessment 
procedures by non-governmental bodies to ensure that they are not more trade 
restrictive than necessary; 
                                            
17 Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, 2nd Edition, 
Routledge, London – New York, 2000 
10 
2. The Understanding on the Interaction of Articles XVII of the GATT, which 
provides for control over the conduct of state trading enterprises; 
3. The Agreement on Safeguards requires Member States not to encourage or 
support the adoption or maintenance by public or private enterprises of equivalent 
non-governmental measures to voluntary export restraints; 
4. The General Agreement on Trade in Services includes rules designed to 
ensure that monopolies and exclusive service suppliers do not nullify or impair 
obligations and commitments under the GATS, particularly where monopolies are 
also active in related competitive market segments. The 1997 Plurilateral 
Agreement on basic Telecommunications Services incorporates regulatory 
principles aimed at preventing anti-competitive practices by major suppliers18 and 
ensuring that the interconnection practices of such suppliers do not impede market 
access and meet non-discrimination requirements; 
5. The TRIPS Agreement permits the application of competition policy to abuse 
of intellectual property rights, including compulsory licensing; 
6. The Agreement on Government Procurement regulates tendering procedures 
so as to ensure optimum effective international competition and addresses certain 
competition problems such as collusive tendering. 
                                            
18 Such as anti-competitive cross-subsidization, use of information obtained from competitors, and 
withholding technical and commercial information 
11 
 
This unique position of competition policy with respect to the international trade 
system has inspired me to structure this paper around the basic interactions between 
trade and competition policies with some non-exhaustive consideration of 
environmental and labor standards, as well as investment regulations related to trade. 
 
It is not the goal of this piece to provide a comprehensive picture of international 
policy coordination. Rather, I try to analyze the feasibility of traditional antitrust 
analysis’ application toward trade policy in general and within the WTO legal practice, 
in particular.  From this angle, the task of policy coordination could be represented 
using the concepts of “market access”, “benefits accruing” and “competitive 
relationship” between domestically produced and imported goods and services.  
Within this framework the discussion is structured as follows: 
 
1. The first chapter is dealing with broader theoretical approaches to 
international policy coordination in neoclassical and institutional settings 
(illustrated by figures 2.1, 2.2 and 3 of the Appendices). 
2. The second chapter is covering competition policy issues. It is focused on the 
concepts of “market access”, “benefits accruing” and “established competitive 
12 
relationship between domestically produced and imported products” as the basic 
pillars of contemporary trading system (illustrated by figures 1, 2, 2.1, 2.2, 3 of 
the appendices). 
3. The third chapter discusses the issues of trade policy and the influence of 
antitrust concepts on them (illustrated by figures 4-11 of the appendices). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
1. EXTERNALITIES AND THEORY OF POLICY 
COORDINATION 
 
1.1 Externalities associated with national policy choices: how do they travel? 
 
The relationship between trade policy on the one side and competition, labor and 
environmental policies on the other, has become an object scholastic attention 
comparatively recently. Competition policy is obviously located at the center of 
debates on the appropriate scope of the WTO. Member countries are now considering 
the desirability of broadening the WTO’s orientation beyond the realm of 
conventional trade policy measures including labor and environmental standards as 
well as competition policy concerns. Nevertheless, before proceeding toward policy 
coordination, it is necessary to outline economic foundations of the GATT / WTO. 
 
The economic foundations of the GATT / WTO were extensively investigated in the 
works of many trade policy scholars, including Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger, 
James Levinson, Henrik Horn, Alan Sykes, Jagdish Bhagawati, Drusilla K. Brown, 
Alan V. Deardorff, and Robert M. Stern, Martin Richardson, Sadao Nagaoka, Oliver 
14 
Cadot, Jean-Marie Grether and Jaime de Melo, and many others.19 Their scientific 
inquiries have not delivered thus far a commonly shared framework for economic 
analysis of policy interactions. As Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger admitted in 
their article “An Economic Theory of GATT” 20 , “the economists have not yet 
developed a unified framework that interprets and evaluates the principles that form 
the foundation of the GATT”. The interaction of WTO trade policies with adjoining 
realms of regulation is even less developed field of research. Anyway, a bunch of 
valuable insights is already at the disposal of scholars concerned with other 
dimensions of contemporary trading system, such as legal enforcement, practice of 
                                            
19 Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, “An Economic Theory of GATT,” American Economic Review, 
XCIX, March 1999, pp. 215-248; Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, “Domestic Policies, National S
overeignty, and International Economic Institutions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2001, pp. 
519-562; Horn, Henrik and James Levinsohn, “Merger Policies and Trade Liberalization, “ Economic J
ournal, April 2001, pp. 244-276; Levinsohn, James, “Competition Policy and International Trade,” in J
agdish Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec (eds.), Fair Trade and Harmonization: Volume 1 (Economic  An
alysis), pp. 329-356, The MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1996; Richardson, Martin, “Trade and Competiti
on Policies: Concordia Discourse?” Oxford Economic Papers, 51(4), 1999, pp. 649-664; Bhagawati, Ja
gdish, “The Demands to Reduce Domestic Diversity among Trading Nations,” in Jagdish Bhagawati an
d Robert E. Hudec, eds., Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade?, Volume 2 (Leg
al Analysis), (Cambridge, MA: the MIT Press, 1996); Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorff, and 
Robert M. Stern, “International Labor Standards and Trade: A Theoretical Analysis,” in Jagdish Bhaga
wati and Robert E. Hudec, eds., Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade?, Volume 
1 (Economic Analysis), (Cambridge, MA: the MIT Press, 1996), Oliver Cadot, Jean-Marie Grether and 
Jaime de Melo, “Trade and Competition Policy: Where do we stand?”, Journal of World Trade, March 
2000; Sadao Nagaoka, “International Trade Aspects of Competition Policy”, NBER Working Paper Ser
ies, Working Paper 6720, September 1998, etc. 
20 Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, “An Economic Theory of GATT”, the American Economic 
Review, Vol. 89, No.1 (Mar., 1999), 215-248 
15 
multilateral negotiations and dispute settlement, thus they have a potential to be 
applied in other areas of WTO policy research. 
 
As it was mentioned in “Competition Policy and the WTO” of Kyle Bagwell and 
Robert Staiger, “the foreign government is only interested in the competition policy 
choices of the home government to the extent that these choices affect market access 
afforded to foreign exporters. As a consequence the international inefficiency 
associated with non-cooperative Nash policy choices takes a simple form: insufficient 
market access.”21  
 
The overall framework worked out within neoclassical approach to legal environment 
provided by the GATT and WTO 22  presupposes that the interaction among 
competition, standardization and trade policies travels practically exclusively through 
the “terms-of-trade” externality. Thus, it could be claimed that there is actually no 
need to infringe on national sovereignty of Member governments to attain the goals of 
efficient multilateral trading system23. Within standard trade theory analysis24, the 
                                            
21 Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger, “Competition Policy and the WTO”, First Draft: August 17, 2001 
22 Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, “An Economic Theory of GATT”, the American Economic 
Review, Vol. 89, No.1 (Mar., 1999), 215-248 
23  Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger, “Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and International 
Economic Institutions’, The Quartery Journal of Economics, May 2001 
24 The analytical setting is classic: two-country and two-good model, and only one government is 
16 
“foreign” government was “allowed” to choose only its trade policy (tariff rates), but 
when it is no more the case, in the meaning that if a foreign government can pick its 
domestic standards as well, “an interesting new issue arises. This issue concerns the 
channels by which the policy choices of one country can affect that country’s trading 
partners in the presence of non-competitive firms, and it is an issue that does not arise 
under the perfectly competitive environment considered in Bagwell and Staiger 
(2001).”25 The additional source of inefficiency in this case goes through the changes 
in domestic elasticity of supply, affected by the choices of foreign country’s standards. 
“Domestic policy choices effect the slope of the foreign export supply curve even 
while holding the position of the foreign export supply curve fixed at the original 
world price,”26 The same is true for foreign policy choices as well, especially in the 
realm of inherently domestic policies. 
 
Changes in domestic elasticity of supply are likely to affect long term market 
dynamics in a way that would harm the level of negotiated market access on a greater 
                                                                                                                             
allowed to chose its competition policy options, while in the other country (usually in foreign one) 
markets are perfectly competitive and do not require any kind of competition policy, see: Kyle Bagwell 
and Robert Staiger, “Competition Policy and the WTO”, First Draft: August 17, 2001 
25 Bagwell K. and Robert Staiger, Petros C. Mavroidis, ”It’s a Question of Market Access”, American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 96, 56 – 76, 2002 
26 Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger, “Competition Policy and the WTO”, First Draft: August 17, 2001, 
P. 25 
17 
scale than it would have been the case given no commitments were achieved at all. 
In this chapter the author provides a review of existing approaches to the economics 
of interaction among different policies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
1.2 Practical implications for policy coordination 
 
The first approach toward the nature of international trade agreements, their 
consequences and significance for international policy coordination is drawn from the 
general economic analysis. 
 
The final finding of Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger in “Domestic Policies, 
National Sovereignty, and International Economic Institutions”27 claims that the main 
problem with the coordination of trade, competition and environmental policies28 in 
the current trade system is the need to make existing legal framework more flexible.  
 
According to them, all provisions necessary for attaining efficient international policy 
choices were introduced to the GATT from the very beginning. Those clauses are 
Article XXIII of the GATT, containing the Members’ right to bring violation as well 
as “non-violation” complaints29 to the DSB and Article XXVIII of the GATT, which 
contains special procedures for renegotiations of bound tariff concessions. Taken 
                                            
27 Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, “Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and International Economic 
Institutions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2001, pp. 519-562 
28 Not only environmental, but any other policy, requiring some form of domestic regulation 
29 Actually, it also sets out procedures for “violation” complaints. 
19 
together these two provisions provide all necessary legal instruments for the process 
of international policy coordination, while the only choice that governments make are 
still tariff rates. In this setting, Member states obtain even more sovereignty, than it is 
usually thought of30. The theory presented by Bagwell and Staiger is overly general. It 
was originally supposed to find a rationale under the present WTO system, but does 
not consider specific ways that are used in practice to curtail market access. To 
elaborate on those practicalities, “market discipline” approach could be helpful. 
 
The economic significance of international trade agreements can be assessed through 
its consequences: trade liberalization and “import discipline” brought with it. Within 
this view, trade and competition policies in their domestic and international contexts 
are seen as interchangeably close to each other. Olivier Cadot, Jean-Marie Grether and 
Jaime de Melo considered in “Trade and Competition Policy: Where do we stand?”31, 
that “import-discipline” hypothesis is an economic ground of trade and competition 
policy interactions in non-strategic and strategic environments.  
 
The hypothesis as such is quite straightforward and imply, that one of the key sources 
                                            
30 Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, “Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and International Economic 
Institutions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2001, pp. 519-562 
31 Olivier Cadot, Jean-Marie Grether and Jaime de Melo in “Trade and Competition Policy: Where do we stand?”, 
Journal of World Trade, March 2000. 
20 
of gains from international trade is that international competition constraints the 
ability of domestic producers to engage in anti-competitive practices, which would 
otherwise reduce welfare. However, Olivier Cadot and others found a series of 
caveats in reasoning concerning the empirical testing of import-discipline approach. 
The common idea behind various verifications is the notion that “the ratio of imports 
to domestic supply tends to be negatively correlated with the profitability of domestic 
sellers, especially when domestic concentration is high.”32 
 
There are two underlying assumptions in this model. Firstly, import penetration is 
thought as a reasonably good proxy for exposure to international competition. 
Secondly, the concentration of domestic producers is perceived as closely correlated 
with their market power in autarky, so that the profits of a concentrated industry are 
more vulnerable to foreign competition than those of an industry that is already 
competitive in autarky.  
 
Here the first question arises: whether the rents of a non-competitive industry are 
more susceptible to shifting to the benefit of foreign suppliers and at the expense of 
domestic consumers and overall national welfare than profits of comparatively more 
                                            
32 Schamalensee, R. and R. Willing, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization (Amsterdam, North-Holland: 
1989) 
21 
competitive ones? Is it true that an economy, where the relative share of non-
competitive industries is high, is more inclined to be a “victim” of strategic rent 
shifting of its trading partners? 
 
Most of the empirical tests dealing with “import discipline” hypothesis contain the 
regression of the measure of profitability, such as price-cost margins, on import 
penetration and a number of other factors potentially contributing to industry’s 
profitability. Typical regression equation looks as follows33: 
 
PCMit (average price-cost margin for an industry, industry (i), time period (t)) = f (the 
measure of concentration34, import penetration ratio, capital-output ratio, industry 
dummy, time dummy, multiplicative form of concentration and import penetration 
ratio) (1) 
 
The multiplicative form of concentration and import penetration ratio in (1) reflects 
that the effect of foreign competition on profitability should be higher when the 
concentration of domestic producers is significant, because high profits in a 
                                            
33 Roberts, M. and J. Taybout, “A Preview of the Country Studies” in Roberts, M. and J. Taybout eds., Industrial 
Evolution in Developing Countries, (Oxford University Press: 1996) 
34 HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index), for example 
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concentrated industry are likely to show a higher degree of market power.  The 
coefficient on this variable is expected to be negative. The capital-output ratio reflects 
that average price-cost margins incorporate remuneration on the capital invested in 
the industry as well, whence the more capital-intensive the industry the higher price-
cost margin it has35. The results, however, should be interpreted with caution.  
 
Here are caveats in this approach that were spelled out in Olivier Cadot, Jean-Marie 
Grether and Jaime de Melo’s article. Firstly, profitability could be controlled by 
specific industry characteristics. Different industries may be characterized by different 
levels of productive efficiency. Thus more efficient industries may be better equipped 
to maintain profitability in the face of foreign competition. Some industries can stay 
competitive and avoid the erosion of their profits thanks to their ability to innovate 
and compete in dimensions other than price. In this case estimates of the relationship 
between profitability and import penetration are likely to incorporate those hidden 
effects and appear to be biased. Dummies on industry characteristics and on 
exogenous macroeconomic influences (changes in real exchange rates, interest rates, 
etc.) could be included if the panel data are available. That in fact means that if 
                                            
35 Olivier Cadot, Jean-Marie Grether and Jaime de Melo notice, that there is a voluminous literature on this issue 
and the evidence is overwhelmingly in support of the “import discipline” hypothesis, but the interpretations of 
those results could be mixed.  
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foreign firms that are perceived domestically to be efficient are unable to penetrate 
home market, it does not necessarily mean that local firms engage in anticompetitive 
behavior. This point has been completely missing in the position of US Trade 
Authorities.  
 
At the end of 1980s, for example, the US Trade Representative observed that if a 
foreign market was not penetrable by efficient American firms, and if no sovereign 
restraint could be found, then the private restraint must exist. The US Assistant 
Attorney General for Antitrust added that if trade law could not pry open a closed 
foreign market, then US antitrust law could and would do the job.36 “The emerging 
insight” about “synergy between trade and competition policy at the point of market 
access”, however, blocked the international development of an alternative view, which 
stands on the assumption that locally groomed cultural peculiarities in business 
practices can make local businesses more efficient in local environment given that no 
actual collusion occurred. The Japan-Film case also showed that countries other than 
the United States were not ready completely to accept its radical view on the 
phenomenon and basic features of collusion, which was regarded as all private 
cooperation beyond the scope of traditional American business practices. 
                                            
36 Eleanor Fox, “Toward World Antitrust and Market Access”, American Journal of International Law 
91 (1997), 10-12 
24 
 
The second argument is closely connected to the first one and deals with technology. 
When firms’ technological heterogeneity is taken into consideration, the other caveat 
of the model shows up. Presence of technological advantage can give rise to 
economies of scale. 
 
Generally, the more efficient the firm, the higher its margin is, the faster its growth 
and the larger its market share37. At the industry level it leads to a positive relationship 
between aggregate margins and concentration, which reflects heterogeneity rather 
than collusive behavior. This makes the results of price-cost margin regression on 
import penetration hard to interpret straightforwardly. In some cases even the plant 
performance data need to be available for clearer understanding38. The econometric 
technique, which is able to distinguish between technological and pro-competitive 
effects of trade liberalization involve the introduction of dummy variables for plants’ 
market share and industry dummies. If plant’s price-cost margin depends primarily on 
the plant’s market share and industry coefficients are not significant, then the 
technology is an explanation. If mostly the industry dummies are significant, it is a 
                                            
37 Demsetz, H., “Industry Structure, Market Rivalry and Public Policy”, Journal of Law and Economics, 16, 1-10  
38 Olivier Cadot, Jean-Marie Grether and Jaime de Melo in “Trade and Competition Policy: Where do we stand?”, 
Journal of World Trade, March 2000. 
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sign that firms within the industry exercise market power39. 
 
Thirdly, there are also other limitations of the model. The higher import penetration 
subsequent to trade liberalization does not necessarily mean that domestic firms prior 
to trade opening were engaged in anti-competitive behavior. In accordance with 
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, trade liberalization is likely to put a downward pressure on 
capital rate-of-return in capital-intensive import-competing industries, and it has 
nothing to do with anti-competitive practices as such. Thus the results of regression 
analysis of price-cost margins on import penetration in some of the industries40 are 
inclined to be mixed, including the effects of trade liberalization that are not 
connected with antitrust concerns. The type of trade that can bring competitive 
discipline is intra-industry trade. Whence, the formula cited above is likely to be more 
reliable for industries, where intra-industry trade is substantial.  
 
Also, in this analytical framework the price-cost margins are meant to reflect the 
extent of market power. It disregards, however, the tendency of costs to increase at the 
                                            
39 Olivier Cadot, Jean-Marie Grether and Jaime de Melo in “Trade and Competition Policy: Where do we stand?”, 
Journal of World Trade, March 2000. 
40 Specifically, it is about industries, which procure most of their intermediate products and production factors at 
home.  In those industries the “trade component” could substantially overweight the “discipline” factor in price-
cost margins’ reduction after trade liberalization. 
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absence of competition because of the slack management41. Taking into consideration 
this factor, it is quite possible that on the first stage of trade liberalization the 
increasing pressure on domestic firms would induce corporate restructuring and active 
cost cutting, leading to the lower costs at constant prices. But the extent of this 
managerial inefficiency fixing cannot be overwhelming in a market economy, since 
even in autarky economic profits would attract new entry, when there is no special 
regulation, and finally new entrants would drive the rents down, however not 
necessarily to the marginal cost. 
 
Fourthly, the import penetration ratio could also be affected by the ability of domestic 
firms to deter foreign entry. This is a realm of antitrust law activity. Incumbent 
companies can use a number of “predatory” strategies to fend off foreign competitors 
or drive them out of the country.  
 
Although it is not clear whether those predatory practices are viable and sustainable 
from the economic point of view, it is argued, for example, in the “long purse” model, 
that past profits can enable domestic producers to undercut foreign competitors’ price 
even if it is not profitable for locals. The main justification for this kind of behavior 
                                            
41 So-called X-inefficiency 
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comprises the firms’ anticipation of monopoly or collective market power conduct in 
the future.  
 
The empirical results on predatory strategies are, however, mixed. The problem of 
endogenous variables impedes scholars from achieving a distinct effect of trade 
liberalization on the state of domestic competition. Competitive pressure is not 
necessarily reflected in international trade flows. When markets can be defined as 
sufficiently contestable, such that producers bear low sunk costs and the consumer 
switching costs are also low, domestic and foreign firms are engaged into the 
Bertrand-like price competition. In this case low import penetration means that 
domestic producers stay under significant pressure from foreign competitors and have 
to price their products at the world price level. When the transportation costs are high, 
incumbents can also use “limit pricing” technique to deter foreign entry.  
 
In the conclusion it could be claimed that trade liberalization and a strict domestic 
competition policy may be viewed as close substitutes in their welfare effects, and this 
hypothesis was relatively solidly established in the empirical literature.42 The question 
                                            
42 See also, Neven, D.J. and P. Seabright, “Trade Liberalization and the Coordination of Competition Policy” in L. 
Waverman W. Comanor and A. Goto (eds.), Competition Policy in the Global Economy: Modalities for 
Cooperation, (Routledge: 1997).   
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is whether the strict domestic competition policy may be viewed as superfluous, when 
international trade is substantially liberalized? Whether the “predatory pricing” is 
more viable in the export market or in the domestic market? Is it plausible to claim 
that instead of using expensive and unreliable predation within home market against 
imports, it is more efficient for import competing firms to mobilize the powers of the 
nation-state and prevent foreign competitors from coming on the domestic market? 
 
There are three arguments, that domestic competition policy enforcement is not 
necessarily marginal, if the trade is liberalized. Any domestic economy suffers from 
ample heterogeneity. Some local industries are more competitive, especially those that 
are developed on abundant factors of production. Import competing industries that 
produce on scarce factors are likely to be in less advantageous position than their 
foreign competitors. Some of the sectors stay in autarky due to the government 
regulations or in case they are providing public goods. 
 
Thus, firstly, imports cannot bring competitive discipline into the non-competitive 
sectors, especially in local closed service industries. Secondly, product differentiation 
and other aspects of non-price competition may protect domestic firms from foreign 
competition to some degree. Thirdly, if transportation and other additional costs of 
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delivering products or services from abroad are substantial, it may prevent the 
competitive pressure from coming even after complete trade liberalization occurs. 
Fourth, certain anti-competitive practices, such that vertical agreements between 
manufacturers and distributors, may have the effect of restricting market access 
granted throughout trade negotiations to the foreign producers.  
 
Presumably, import-competing lobbies at home can seek protection from foreign 
competition by means other than trade policy: for example, by lobbying for looser 
competition laws allowing domestic firms to engage into concerted behavior that 
impair market access granted to foreign firms. 
 
Even more difficult questions arise, when we consider the interaction between trade 
and competition policies in the strategic environment. As it was mentioned by 
Levinsohn in “Competition Policy and International Trade Policy” 43 , whereas 
competition is aimed at curbing the market power of domestic producers, strategic 
trade policy is aimed to use their market power in order to shift rents away from 
foreigners. In this sense, strategic trade and competition policies work in opposite 
directions. Both the effects and motivations of those regimes should be clarified. 
                                            
43 Levinsohn in “Competition Policy and International Trade Policy”, in J.N. Bhagwati and R. Hudec (eds.), Fair 
Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? (MIT Press, 1996). 
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As it was seen from the previous analysis, the liberalization of international trade 
itself, notwithstanding any additional qualifications, can serve as an effective tool of 
enhancing international as well as domestic competition. Despite the fact that 
incorporation of competition policy provisions into the WTO Agreements received a 
cautious attitude thus far, even the Uruguay Round Agreements show the tendency 
toward obligations prosecuting and sanctioning private parties’ anti-competitive 
conduct. Present scope of the WTO encompasses domestic barriers and distortions 
that used to be out of trade policy reach.  
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1.3 Private Parties’ Regulation under the WTO 
 
Except for cases of dumping, state trading monopolies and companies enjoying 
exclusive or special privileges, GATT lacks rules explicitly regulating private parties’ 
conduct. National Treatment provision provides foreign parties with the “guarantee” 
of non-discrimination on the domestic market. The requirement of publication and 
equal administration of trade regulations is designed specifically to implement 
transparency requirement. It should be admitted, however, and some disputes 
confirmed that44, the Parties have no clear obligations in the field of competition 
policy execution with respect to the foreign firms. The only obligation is to provide 
“equal footing” for domestic and foreign companies within national markets under the 
National Treatment clause. There is also an inherent danger for the world trading 
system that arises from potentially active utilization of “non-violation” complaints, 
when nullification or impairment occurs. The complainant in this case cannot claim 
the respondent’s measure at issue to be removed, but it can withdraw “substantially 
equivalent concessions” of its own in response. Then, what is the difference between 
such kind withdrawal and retaliation? 
                                            
44 Fuji-Kodak case or Asbestos case, for example 
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The provisions concerning private parties’ behavior in the realm of international trade 
were already included into the Havana Charter. Chapter V of the Havana Charter 
deals with restrictive business practices that contracting parties ought to prevent and 
sanction.45 They are defined in Article 46 as those “commercial practices of private 
parties affecting international trade, restricting competition, limiting market access or 
leading to monopolistic control, when those practices have negative effects on the 
expansion of production and trade, and interfere in the obtaining of any of the 
designated objectives.” Article XXIX of GATT incorporated the Havana Charter in 
anticipation of GATT’s expected merger into the ITO in the following provision and 
the failure of ITO does not affect the enforcement of this Article: 
 
“The contracting parties (currently Members) undertake to observe to the fullest 
extent of their executive authority the general principles of chapters I to VI inclusive 
and of chapter IX of the Havana Charter, pending their acceptance of it in accordance 
with their constitutional procedures.”46  In accordance with the general treatment of 
the international public law, Chapter V of the Havana Charter is still the part of the 
                                            
45 Carmen Otero Garcia Castrillon, “Private Parties under the Present WTO (Bilateralist) Competition Regime”, 
Journal of World Trade 35 (1): 99 – 122, 2001  
46 Ibid 
33 
GATT-94. In 1955 the GATT contracting parties agreed to eliminate the relationship 
with the Havana Charter with the proposal to derogate Article XXIX. The proposal 
was passed unanimously, but was never adopted because one contracting party did not 
ratify the modification.47 In 1960, the Report of the Group of Experts on Restrictive 
Business Practices rejected a multilateral negotiation on restrictive business practices 
without considering the existence of the Havana Charter and Article XXIX of the 
GATT. On the contrary the Report proposed that the interested contracting Parties 
should hold consultations among themselves concerning the matters they were 
interested in. In 1984 in the United States – Canada, on the Administration of the 
Foreign Investments Review Act48 the Panel raised the question about whether Article 
XXIX of the GATT is still viable. The result was inconclusive, and the fact that in the 
notorious Fuji-Kodak case the United States did not use Article XXIX shows its lack 
of significance in contemporary WTO jurisprudence.  
 
The US strives to enforce some of the anti-competitive provisions in WTO dispute 
settlement on the one hand, and resists the adoption of the multilateral rules on 
competition policy on the other. This indicates that US authorities are not ready to 
limit their discretion in deciding which particular cases they want to invoke their right 
                                            
47 Report (L/327), adopted 28 February, (5 and 7 March 1955), BISD Supp. 3 at 240 (1955). 
48 (L/5504), adopted 7 February 1984, BISD Supp. 30 at 140 – 168 (1984) 
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to request the prosecution of anti-competitive conduct within the territories of its 
trading partners. US government is not inclined to be the subject of those requests 
from other WTO Members. Political considerations seem to outweigh the pure 
economic reasons thus far.  
 
To sum up the theoretical foundations of international policy coordination, it should 
be mentioned that there is no clearly defined theory describing this process. Bagwell 
and Staiger tried to find a common place through connecting different domestic 
policies to trade policy, which is inherently international. The outcome came up to be 
supportive on the current framework of the world trading system, and critical on 
special “competition agenda”. As an externalities’ transmission tool was identified as 
relative world price. Since the relative world price is strictly a theoretical concept, the 
whole framework did not provide any practical avenues for policy development.  
 
“Import discipline” hypothesis, on the other hand, suggested that competition policy 
in a liberalized economy is not superfluous. Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 3 illustrate the idea. 
 
These preliminary findings are elaborated in the next section. 
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2. SHOULD WE USE ANTITRUST THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
PRACTICE? 
 
2.1 An Alternative to Antitrust in International Trade – Institutional Approach 
 
It is usually assumed that theory underlying national antitrust policies provide a 
sufficient analytical background for policy choices. Nevertheless, some scholars 
challenge this assumption asserting, that theory accepting imaginary “perfectly 
competitive markets” as a benchmark, has nothing to do with real economic 
environment. As it was contended by Ignacio de Leon in “Should we Promote 
Antitrust in International Trade”49, “[the] kind of government regulation presents 
severe theoretical and empirical shortcomings which call into question its desirability 
as a policy to promote entrepreneurship and competition.”50 The links between trade 
and competition policies increasingly being examined under the WTO provide an 
additional impetus for closer scrutiny of competition policy theoretical background, 
                                            
49  Ignacio de Leon, “Should We Promote Antitrust in International Trade”, World Competition, 
December, 1998 
50 Ibid 
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since its introduction into the international trade practice and dispute settlement is 
capable to overthrow traditional views. 
 
In particular, some of the experts in the Working Group on Interaction between Trade 
and Competition Policies mentioned that “antitrust is unable to grasp, and therefore to 
regulate, the process of competition which it is supposed to encourage. As a 
consequence of this impossibility the policy does not promote trade. Instead it 
restricts it. These restrictions are even more significant in weak institutional settings, 
such as international trade.”51  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
51  Para. 20, document WT/MIN (96)/ DEC presented at the WTO’s Ministerial Meeting held in 
Singapore in December 1996. See also, T. Eggertsson, The Economic Institutions, S. Schiavo-Campo 
(ed.), World Bank Discussion Papers 241, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1994, pp. 22). He 
claimed, in particular, that “Weak institutions are usually associated with a weak state. In some 
circumstances, various decentralized groups (trading companies, guilds) have taken over the role of the 
state and succeeded in providing stable property rights, but a system based entirely on decentralized 
property rights is unlikely to provide a foundation for modern industrial economy.”    
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2.2 Market Structures and International Trade Regulation: The Shortcomings of 
Antitrust Theory 
 
The discussion presented here is intended to review and analyze an alternative 
structural approach to competition supplied by the ideas developed within neo-
classical economics. The main critique presented by R. Cordato and then upheld by 
Ignacio de Leon52 claims that the basic concepts of contemporary antitrust theory are 
flawed, since they disregard uncertainty, while antitrust authorities’ rulings apparently 
infringes on the material property rights. According to this view, the empirical 
literature allegedly suggests that there is no directly established link between the 
number of firms in the industry (or in the marketplace) and their inclination to collude, 
especially in the presence of unclearly defined property rights in the context of 
international trade. The following discussion starts with short historical reminiscences 
about trade and competition policy interactions in institutional approach settings, then 
presents the debates on free trade – fair trade issue, and concludes with the overall 
assessment of “institutional antitrust”. 
                                            
52 Cordato, Roy E. (1992) Welfare Economics and Externalities in an Open Ended Universe: A Modern 
Austrian Perspective. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers Group; Ignacio de Leon, “Should We 
Promote Antitrust in International Trade”, World Competition, December, 1998 
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 The first antitrust issue in the context of international trade was about the fairness of 
international commerce. As an “unfair” conduct, that should be checked, the sale 
below certain price levels was particularly important, as it embodied the essence of 
domestic producers’ incapability to compete with imports. Whether there is some 
economic meaning in this interpretation of economic fairness is doubtful, since it 
should be concerned primarily with the equality of opportunities, but this idea gave 
rise to the adoption of antidumping provisions within the body of American economic 
law and into the GATT Agreements as well. The incorporation of antidumping 
clauses into the GATT constituted the first step in understanding that trade and 
competition policies interact with each other, and they established the only rules 
dealing with private business conduct within international trade law.  
 
Conventionally, dumping is defined as “exporting at prices below those charged on 
the domestic market (or, if none, on the third country market) or at prices insufficient 
to cover the cost of the goods sold.”53 Subsidies provided to lower the production 
costs of national producers are also deemed unfair and illegal and referred to as “any 
                                            
53 J. Jackson, W. Davey and A. Sykes, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, West 
Publishing Co, St . Paul, Minn, 1995, pp. 671-672.  
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help paid to an industry on products that are exported.”54 For a long time there was no 
accepted explanation of dumping or subsidization, since it seemed against the rational 
firm behavior. “The proponents of the theory argued that selling at a loss would be 
profitable if monopolistic prices could be imposed once domestic rivals were 
displaced by dumped imports. Yet, the supporters of this theory could not explain 
how the new incumbents could impose such abusive prices without encouraging new 
competitors to come up.”55  
 
In the antitrust literature this problem was given attention under the rubric of 
“predatory pricing”. Thanks to development of a structural view on markets, the 
technique of “predation” in domestic as well as in the international context received a 
certain degree of credibility. The interrelations between antidumping practices in 
international trade law and antitrust practices with respect to “predatory pricing” are 
investigated in the next subsection. The main interest of this subsection is to 
accentuate the significance of underlying assumptions, which allow the concept to 
exist.  
 
                                            
54 Ibid, p. 758 
55 Ignacio de Leon, “Should We Promote Antitrust in International Trade”, World Competition, 
December, 1998 
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Structural analysis of markets suggests that market concentration is regarded as 
essential to judge the degree of market competitiveness; the more concentrated the 
market, the less competitive it is likely to be56. Ignacio de Leon even claims that “the 
structural understanding of markets turned into a true “paradigm” in the Kuhnian 
sense. Over time it became broadly shared at the international fora.”57 In the joint 
progress report of the Committee on Competition Law and Policy and the Trade 
Committee of OECD, it was specifically emphasized: “globalization should produce 
more efficient production and marketing, lower prices and improved product quality 
and variety, but it will fail to do so unless market access and competition can be 
preserved and enhanced.”58  
 
So the primary link between trade and competition policies goes through the market 
access concept. According to this view markets themselves can create obstacles for 
                                            
56 The summary of public interest theory of regulation is found in W. Mitchel and R. Simmons, Beyond 
Politics: Markets, Welfare and the Failure of Bureaucracy, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994, pp. 3-37; 
Jeffrey Church and Roger Ware, Industrial Organization: Strategic Approach, International Editions, 
2000;       
57 Ignacio de Leon, “Should We Promote Antitrust in International Trade”, World Competition, 
December, 1998 and see, T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, The University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1970 
58 OECD Working Papers, Trade and Competition Policies, No. 35, Paris, 1994 
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their own functioning, and the task of a competition authority is to distinguish 
between “fair” and “unfair” business practices.59 
 
The empirical evidence raised by the public choice school casts serious doubts upon 
the soundness of public policy delivered by the governments. This literature supplies 
abundant evidence on how governments, not the markets, fail to deliver public interest, 
which in the present case means the promotion of competition.  
 
Thus, in Beyond Politics: Markets, Welfare and the Failure of Bureaucracy W. 
Mitchel and R. Simmons say, for instance, that the most prominent feature of 
regulation is the “capture” of a regulator by regulated industries. In more subtle 
variants of a “capture” theory it is argued that rents are spread among different 
competing groups and do not benefit only one constituency group, such as a producer. 
This might explain that antitrust is likely to be shaped by the combined private 
interest of less efficient competitors, government attorneys seeking fame and 
experience in the field, economists expecting high income from their professional 
                                            
59 W. Shughart, J. Silverman and R. Tollison, Antitrust Enforcement and Foreign Competition, in The 
Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: The Public Choice Perspective, F. McChesney and W. 
Shughart (eds.), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1995 
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advice as court experts, bureaucracy, litigants and the like. Several empirical studies 
were presented on this issue.60 
 
The important theoretical shortcomings of neo-classical perspective include the 
abstractness of the notion of “equilibrium”, which was not properly emphasized in the 
literature. It is argued that “[the limitations of the neo-classical theory] have 
misguided policy makers for decades, making them prone to believe that it is possible 
to attain an “optimal” state of social efficiency, where resources would presumably be 
allocated according to their “highest” social value. They [limitations] have framed in 
the minds of policy-makers a whole “regulatory” paradigm, inviting “corrective 
government intervention to offset perceived “market failures”. Given that determining 
the instances of such market failures normally conveys a degree of administrative 
discretion, the result of enforcing this paradigm is that property rights are constantly 
threatened by unwarranted government intervention. The aftermath of this process is 
that competition itself will be discouraged, as firms would not know for sure their 
access to social resources and the real extent of their entitlements.”61 
                                            
60The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: The Public Choice Perspective, F. McChesney and W. 
Shughart (eds.), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1995; G. Stigler, “The Theory of Economic 
Regulation”, 2 Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 1971; S. Peltzman, “Toward a 
More General Theory of Regulation”, 19 Journal of Law and Economics, 1976: 211-240  
61 Ignacio de Leon, “Should We Promote Antitrust in International Trade”, World Competition, 
December, 1998 
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Scientific analysis in antitrust investigations is grounded in the “models” representing 
the behavior of “market forces”62.  These models, of course, cannot evaluate the 
whole complexity of the real world hence they have to be based on certain 
simplifications, or “assumptions”. Usually, they compare consequently how the 
examined aspects of the reality would change, if assumptions were relaxed. The 
variables excluded from the model are regarded as “fixed” and as not influencing the 
outcome.  
 
This kind of models represents the ideal visions of reality, not the reality as such. 
Government policies worked out in accordance with them would indispensably suffer 
from various distortions, since they do not touch upon real behavior of economic 
agents, but mainly reflect their perceived reactions expected in compliance with the 
predictions.  
 
Here a more elaborate scrutiny of the concept of “equilibrium” is in place. An 
important caveat related to the notion of “equilibrium” is that under such a state, 
                                            
62 The critiques of neo-classical economics presented in various works, for example, in S. Cheung, The 
Myth of Social Cost: A Critique of Welfare Economics and the Implications for Public Policy, Institute 
of Economic Affairs, London, 1978.  
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social resources are allocated most efficiently among economic agents, according to 
their highest attached value.63 The state of equilibrium is possible within the markets, 
which shows certain properties, for example, populated with agents possessing perfect 
information about present and future technical capabilities of the particular industry, 
complete knowledge about the strategies of rivals and consumer preferences. In this 
setting individual firms cannot manipulate market environment to their advantage.  
 
The implicit idea of the competition policy is that the closer the structure of a real 
market to that “social optimum” state of perfect competition, the more likely it was 
that the competition would be brought about. All real markets are classified as 
“imperfect” and “monopolistic”. Based on this theoretical background, the economists 
have developed a reasoning to explain how market concentration limits competition. 
However, the purpose of positive models is not to depict a reality, but to create a tool 
for its “preparation”. As it was argued “policy-makers assumed that their actions 
should replicate, wherever possible, ideal market structures or at least, to approximate 
real markets to those optimal standards. In this way, they would encourage the 
optimal efficient allocation of social resources across the society.”64  
                                            
63 V. Pareto, Manual of Political Economy, Macmillan, London, 1970 
64  Ignacio de Leon, “Should We Promote Antitrust in International Trade”, World Competition, 
December, 1998 
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In this setting, however, the policy-makers have ignored those assumptions and 
limitations that had been originally made while creating a model: the dynamic 
competition has been disregarded. The models of “pure monopoly”, “monopolistic 
competition” and “oligopoly” would not commonly be more useful in regulating the 
reality, since they often assume complete information and simultaneous actions by 
market participants.  
 
Recent developments in game theory provide certain tools that are able to alleviate 
given constraints. They are equipped to provide for incomplete information as well as 
sequential actions of market agents. However, the development of this body of 
literature is not sufficient to provide firm theoretical foundations for antitrust policy65.  
The critique of neo-classical approach to antitrust seems plausible in some respects. 
However, its proponents do not propose a clear alternative understanding of 
competition and competition policy. It was argued though that the focus of public 
policy should not be the comparison of real markets with ideal, yet unattainable, state 
                                            
65 See, for example, Anderson S. and M. Engers, “Stackelberg versus Cournot Oligopoly Equilibrium”, 
International Journal of Industrial Organization 10: 127-135, 1992; H. Demsetz, “Barriers to Entry”, 
American Economic Review 72: 47-57, 1982; A. Dixit, “The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence”, 
Economic Journal 90: 95 – 106, 1980; A. Dixit, “Recent Development in Oligopoly Theory”, 
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 72: 12 – 17. Paul R. Krugman, Rethinking 
International Trade, 2000: The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England  
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of affairs, but the comparison of rules and institutions which improve or worsen the 
conditions within which economic agents are encouraged to compete66.  
 
This approach has its background from the works of R. Cordato, who introduced a 
“welfare criterion” based upon the so called “Austrian economics”. The basis of 
Cordato's welfare criterion is the judgment that individuals should be able to pursue 
goals, even if they make errors. He writes, that "[the] task of the economist, when 
considering normative questions, is to identify those institutions that best facilitate 
[the process of trial and error]." "[The] overriding purpose...is to identify, generally 
speaking, the framework within which individuals, as social beings, are able to most 
efficiently [i.e., through the trial and error process] pursue their goals."67  
 
Evidently, there is a certain problem with this approach. Although Cordato does not 
point this out, it is evident that an individual could totally fail to achieve any goals. 
                                            
66 The need to understand institutional constraints within which the economic exchanges are performed 
was emphasized by the Austrian School of Economics. The exchange itself in this setting is of 
secondary importance. To this “institutional” perspective, it is irrelevant to judge “efficient” social 
outcomes resulting from market exchange. Instead, the observers should focus their attention upon the 
“efficiency” of the processes leading to such outcomes. Under this new understanding the term 
“institutional efficiency” is judged according to its capability to allow each individual to achieve his 
goals, in the most expedient way. See, R. Cordato, Welfare Economics and Externalities in a Open 
Ended Universe: A Modern Austrian Perspective, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 1992   
67 Cordato, Roy E. (1992) Welfare Economics and Externalities in an Open Ended Universe: A Modern 
Austrian Perspective. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers Group. 
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He may also prefer a system in which freedom to pursue goals may be limited in some 
way. Nevertheless, if institutions enabled him to pursue his goals through the trial and 
error process, the institutions would be judged as good. He labels his criterion for 
judging institutions "catallactic efficiency."68 With this welfare criterion in mind, he 
goes on to describe two characteristics of what he calls the ideal institutional setting69.  
 
The first characteristic is private property. The second is freedom to exchange. Such a 
setting will "best facilitate the use and discovery of information, the appropriateness 
and relevance of which can only be known by those who need to discover and use it." 
And it will "allow individuals to gather the necessary physical resources" to carry out 
their individual plans.”70 
 
With respect to how such an ideal should be employed, Cordato refers to certain 
"institutional inefficiencies...that are generated by deviations from the 'ideal' legal 
framework."71 He mentions that such inefficiencies "can arise because people are 
prevented in some way from fully utilizing their property or because rights to property 
are not clearly delineated." Cordato admits that the ideal institutional setting is 
                                            
68 Ibid: 65 
69 Ibid: 64 -68 
70 Ibid: 63 
71 Ibid: 69 
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difficult to fully specify. However, in light of his attack on an alternative framework, 
it would seem that he should provide at least some guidance on key issues. 
 
The central concept of Cordato’s writing is on the appropriate delineation of material 
property rights. Leaving the concept of property rights delineation a little bit unclear, 
what he apparently means is that existing material property titles imply, unless 
bargained away, a right to receive compensation for all decreases in value. However, a 
systematic ruling in favor of rights to material property would provide a premium on 
the ownership of such property and a corresponding penalty on the ownership of non-
material factors of production. The importance of this point will become more evident 
in the discussion that follows. 
 
 “As opposed to Coasean analysis, where property rights are the most important 
variable, the Austrian school's approach to all externality related issues has 
consistently been that clearly delineated property titles and rights must be taken as 
given.”72 The discussion developed by Codato, insists on “strict liability” concept 
with respect to clearly delineated material property rights. It is supposed then that any 
“invasion” of those property rights should be compensated. However, as some 
                                            
72 Ibid: 102  
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Corado’s73 critics reasonably point out, the alleviation of uncertainty with respect to 
exploitation of material property rights possessed by their holders would be offset by 
the increased uncertainty for those, who have the rights of action, which are non-
material. The probability that this newly constructed system would operate more 
efficiently is low.  
 
As Patrick Gunning shows, the fundamental inconsistency with Corado’s analysis is 
that he totally disregards the need to assign initial entitlements to non-material factors 
of production -- i.e., to rights to control actions. In the context of competition policy, 
this approach has produced the concept of “dynamic competition” as opposed to the 
traditional understanding of “structural competition.”  
 
It states that in the real world entrepreneurs are surrounded by the “fog of ignorance”, 
which subjects him to make mere speculations about how the future will affect him. 
As G. B. Richardson has argued, entrepreneurs are always forced to seek more 
information to encourage the today to make investments related to the future 
production decisions, regardless of the fact the knowledge could never be complete 
                                            
73 For example, Gunning, J. Patrick, "Austrian Welfare Economics? A Misesian Response", 
(manuscript), and “The Liberal Economist's Dilemma: Rothbard's Critique of Mises's Value-Free 
Economics." (manuscript) 
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and uncertainty will reappear.74 
 
According to the “Austrian School”, entrepreneurship is the process of constant “trials 
and errors”. Businessmen seek to reduce the waste resulting from mistakes made 
under this “trial-and-error” process in ways, which allow them to hold on their initial 
expectations as to how the future will really unfold.  
 
In Welfare Economics and Externalities in an Open Ended Universe: A Modern 
Austrian Perspective75, R. Cordato distinguishes between the future facts driven by 
natural events and those resulted from certain human actions. The first set of 
disturbances may be alleviated by insurance, since it is possible to assign (in 
Cordato’s view) the actuarial probabilities to them.  
 
The second class of events is not eligible for this procedure: human actions cannot be 
subjected to any kind of regularities and predictions, as human beings constantly 
rearrange and redefine their behavior according to ever-changing information, which 
                                            
74 G. B. Richardson, Information and Investment, Oxford University Press, London, 1960, cited from 
Ignacio de Leon, “Should We Promote Antitrust in International Trade”, World Competition, 
December, 1998 
75 Cordato, Roy E. (1992) Welfare Economics and Externalities in an Open Ended Universe: A Modern 
Austrian Perspective. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers Group. 
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in turn makes them to reconsider their goals and objectives76.  
 
To make reasonable decisions, entrepreneurs are forced to build up mutual 
expectations, provide reassurances about their future actions. They could rely on their 
past trading experience, judge their trading partners in compliance with their 
reputation, or they use different kinds of contracts in order to alleviate uncertainty 
associated with incompleteness of information about the future.  
 
In most cases contracts are not available though. Parties to exchanges try to align their 
conduct to that of the rest of entrepreneurs in the industry, on the basis of what they 
expect from them. Obviously, all these techniques limit the possibilities for 
entrepreneurs to choose “independent paths”, but those constraints arise not as a result 
of attempts to monopolize the market, but rather out of desire to mollify the 
uncertainty in business environment, to avoid the losses and forecasting mistakes.  
 
Richardson makes a distinction between business transactions that are competitive and 
                                            
76 This feature of human actions was incorporated into the “traditional” analysis of competition before 
the “structural and game theoretic approaches reaped the priority, see, I. Kirzner, Competition and 
Entrepreneurship, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1973      
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those, which are complementary.77 In case of competitive activities, the increase in the 
level of investment made by one firm negatively affects the rest, as the resulting 
increase in that firm’s future output is likely to reduce the others’ possibilities of 
boosting their own production. In case of complementary investments, a similar 
uncertainty may arise. Here, the investments made by one firm that encourage the 
producers of complementary products to magnify their investments would generate 
the spillover cycle of mutually advantageous production only if the former firm is 
capable to make credible commitments. Is it possible to ensure that? 
 
As Ignacio de Leon argues, there is only one possible answer to this question: the 
firms limit their independence of action in order to uphold the expectations of their 
trading partners as well as their competitors. He also writes that entrepreneurs have no 
real choice in deciding whether they should align their own conduct with the conduct 
of the rest, since this is the only possibility to make the right decision about their 
investments. This conclusion by no means implies that rivalry (“dynamic 
competition”) is excluded, as in the end the future is unknown, and the inevitable 
                                            
77 G. B. Richardson, Information and Investment, Oxford University Press, London, 1960, cited from 
Ignacio de Leon, “Should We Promote Antitrust in International Trade”, World Competition, 
December, 1998 
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emergence of unseen new opportunities would create gaps in knowledge and 
technology, upon which the more active businessmen would win.  
 
This logic suggests that parallel conduct, for instance, provide business environment 
with certain degree of definiteness necessary for decision-making, but it does not 
imply that every firm should abide by the “rules”, if circumstances change or if new 
opportunities arise78. Within this framework the similar flaw applies to the rest of 
“anti-competitive conduct” as well.  
 
From the view of “structural approach”, however, antitrust theory considers this kind 
of performance as a “concerted behavior” aimed at abuse the dominant position. As 
indicated, institutional approach presuppose that within dynamic notion of 
competition, competition does not relate at all to market structure (the number of 
firms), which is regarded as a mere accident of reality with no further consequences.  
 
“Dynamic competition relates to the possibility, prospective into the future, that a 
given entrepreneur will exercise his or her alertness to seize a new opportunity 
                                            
78  Ignacio de Leon, “Should We Promote Antitrust in International Trade”, World Competition, 
December, 1998 
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hitherto unforeseen by the rest of the business community.”79 This activity has to be 
related to the new sector, new product, technique or geographical area. In this case the 
number of market participants is irrelevant. Indeed, under this dynamic paradigm, it is 
impossible to define market structure with relevance to some products or geographical 
areas. Therefore, what is important in this setting is that the entrepreneur would not be 
prevented from exercising his or her alertness by the institutional means: laws, 
regulations, social customs and so on. This approach requires a different approach to 
the competition policy. As Rothbard argues “there are no “monopolistic” prices, but 
only free market prices.”80 The flawed nature of the standard of “social efficiency” 
(“perfect competition”) leaves a lot of space for administrative discretion, which 
actually infringes, in the opinion of Austrian school scholars, on private property 
rights of economic agents.  
 
This “institutional” approach to the competition policy implies a different avenue 
toward the interaction between trade and competition policies. Regulating 
“structural” competition (i.e. counting the number of firms in the market) does not 
necessarily enhance rivalry and entrepreneurship, as antitrust supporters do assume. 
                                            
79 Idid: 51 
80 M. Rothbard, Monopoly and Competition, in Man, Economy and the State: A Treatise on Economic 
Principles, Vol. II, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., New Jersey, 1962 
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Based on the Prisoner’s dilemma situation developed under the game theory81, it is 
possible to predict that governments will be inclined to favor their national firms 
against their foreign counterparts. Yet, the existence of multilateral commitments 
prevents them from making such distinctions and from disguise discrimination against 
foreign firms. They could do that only at the presence of regulatory loopholes 
enabling them to decide according to discretion. Therefore, government discretion 
should be kept to a minimum and any institution developed to promote trade 
transactions and business competition should be designed in accordance with this goal. 
 
In this context, the importance of assignment of property rights should be emphasized. 
Firstly, there should be a proper delineation in the sphere of individual rights, which 
encompasses not only initial delimitation of rights over things (as it comes from the 
Cordato’s view), but also the clear rules over transmission of this rights.82  Secondly, 
it calls for expedite and efficient dispute settlement mechanism allowing the 
elimination of any source of interference and uncertainty in the initial allocation or 
transfer of rights. An efficient dispute settlement system would allow the solution of 
ex-post conflicts over the use of resources due to a poor ex-ante identification and 
                                            
81Approach developed by  Bagwell and Staiger was discussed in the previous section, See also A. Dixit 
and B. J. Nabeluff, Thinking Strategically, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1991 
82 Within this framework the rights of action are still disregarded as it was mentioned in Patrick Gunning’s critique 
56 
assignment of rights.  
 
Therefore, there are two ways in which government intervention is necessary for 
market functioning and competition. First, there is an ex-ante definition of 
entitlements and individual spheres of action and, second, the ex-post intervention 
aimed at clarifying, albeit in an imperfect way, the contents of this sphere of action in 
cases where the initial entitlements are not obvious enough. The ultimate goal of 
defining the rights and entitlements lies in the public interest to prevent unauthorized 
subjects (“free riders”) from obtaining undeserved benefits out of the investments 
made by the legitimate owners. 
 
According to this view, WTO system should have been developing based on a 
different set of priorities. Presently, the most important part of the WTO Agreements 
is concerned with antidumping, subsidies and safeguards, aiming at protecting 
national production base at the face of increased foreign competition. Following 
dynamic competition paradigm, Member countries should have been focusing mostly 
on the harmonization of privatization rules and on making them mutually 
recognizable; on the agreements on state owned enterprises and government 
procurement; intellectual property rights and international investments rules. All these 
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topics (with the exclusion of privatization, which is regarded out of the scope of the 
trade agreements) are now under intensive scrutiny of the various WTO committees, 
but they are not reckoned as a foundation, but rather as complementary agreements. 
Present focus on agricultural subsidies and development agenda is overwhelming.  
 
These elements can also provide the tips of how to reform the competition policy in 
international trade. It should provide economic freedom to market participants in 
order to provide them with effective market access83, which is frequently denied to 
satisfy the interest of different interest groups. This sort of intervention, in Leon’s 
view, will definitely reap the positive results in terms of competition’s promotion in 
more effective way than “chasing elusive monopolistic practices.”84  
 
In sum, the goal of the alternative competition policy in the international trade is to 
enhance the predictability of market participants through reduction of uncertainty over 
their individual rights. If there is an International Economic Order85, fundamentally 
integrated by the WTO system, in case the economic rights (understood in terms of 
                                            
83 With respect to the centrality of the notion of “market access”, institutional approach is not much 
different from that of “structural” avenue.   
84  Ignacio de Leon, “Should We Promote Antitrust in International Trade”, World Competition, 
December, 1998 
85 The suggestion made by Petersman, E.U. Petersman, Constitutional Functions and Constitutional 
Problems of International Economic Law, Pupil 3, University Press, Fribourg, Switzerland, 1991 
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initial entitlements) of the participants are infringed by the trade protectionism, they 
should be protected through the WTO dispute settlement. In fact, this road leads to the 
WTO functioning as a body not only for governments, but for private parties as well.   
 
 
 
 
2.3 The Interaction between Trade and Competition Policies in Neoclassical 
Settings 
 
Already in an early paper of Auquier and Caves86 the tradeoffs between consumer 
welfare and monopoly profits of a corporation from abroad were discussed. Dixit in 
“International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries”87 made the first overview of 
the literature in the area. In particular, he investigates how domestic welfare, in an 
oligopolistic model of international trade, depends on the number of home firms, the 
number of foreign firms, and export subsidies. Dixit was the first who raised a well 
known argument of interchangeability of import tariffs and lax domestic competition 
                                            
86 Auquier, A. and Richard Caves, “Monopolistic Export Industries, Trade Taxes, and Optimal 
Competition Policy”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 89, 1979, pp. 559 - 581  
87 Dixit, Avinash, “International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries”, Economic Journal, 
Supplemental Issue, 1984, pp. 1 - 16  
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policies. He wrote: “the commonly expressed view that the existence of foreign 
competition makes domestic antitrust policy unnecessary, and may even make it 
desirable to encourage mergers of domestic firms, or prevention of the excessive entry, 
so as to keep the home industry strong enough to withstand foreign competition.”88   
From the very beginning of the literature on international mergers and imperfectly 
competitive international markets, there was an understanding that trade and merger 
policies may interact.89   
 
But actually very few papers addressed this interaction directly with the most notable 
exclusion of Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger works. The rapidly expanding literature 
on the interaction of trade and competition policies is focused mainly on merger 
policy analysis in the presence of international competition. Other aspects such as 
vertical restraints, antidumping regulation and international price fixing and their 
implications for the conditions of market access are still underdeveloped from the 
theoretical point of view.  
 
The new “open economy industrial organization” typically analyses how domestic 
                                            
88 Ibid 
89 Ordover, Janusz and Robert Willig, “Perspectives on Mergers and World Competition”, in Grieson, 
Ronald E., (ed.), Antitrust Regulation, Lexington, Mass., and Toronto: Health, Lexington Books, 1986, 
pp. 201 – 18 
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merger policy change when the domestic country trades with other countries. Trade 
policy as such in those papers is at the very background or simply absent.90 Another 
significant paper is that of Bliss 91 , in which the author argues against the 
harmonization of competition policies across countries.  
 
There is also a related literature in international regulation, which investigates the 
issue of delegation of regulatory powers from national authorities to an international 
body.  Bhagawati92, Gatsios and Seabright93, Neven94 also raised this question. The 
main outcome of this discussion is the identification of policy spillovers or 
externalities.95       
                                            
90  The examples of those paper s are Barros, Pedro and Luis Cabral, “Merger Policy in Open 
Economies”, European Economic Review, 38, 1994, pp. 1041 – 1055; Head, Keith and John Ries, 
“International Mergers and Welfare Under Decentralized Competition Policy”, Faculty of Commerce, 
University of British Columbia, Mimeo, 1995; Levinsohn, James, “Competition Policy and 
International Trade Policy”, Fair Trade and Harmonization, J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec (eds.), MIT 
Press, 1996, pp. 329 - 256    
91 Bliss, Christopher, “Trade and Competition Control”, Fair Trade and Harmonization, J. Bhagwati 
and R. Hudec (eds.), MIT Press, 1996, pp. 313 - 328 
92 Bhagwati, Jagwish, “Fair Trade, Reciprocity and Harmonization: the Novel Challenge to the theory 
and policy of free trade”, Paper presented at the Conference on Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the 
Global Trading System, University of Michigan, Ahn Arbor, 1991 
93 Gatsios, Konstantine and Paul Seabright, “Regulation in the European Community”, Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy, Vol. 5 (2), 1990, pp. 37 - 60 
94 Neven, Damien J., “Regulatory Reform in the European Community”, American Economic Review, 
vol. 82 (2), 1992, pp. 98 - 103 
95 The term “policy spillover” was used by Henrik Horn and James Levinsohn in “Merger Policies and 
Trade Liberalization”, NBER, Working Paper 6077, June 1997, while the term “externality” is 
employed in later works of Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger. Their meaning is similar and concerns 
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The fact that the majority of already existing free trade agreements (FTA) and 
customs unions (CU) recognize the need in competition and trade policy coordination 
is a reflection of those perspectives obtained trough thorough investigation of their 
interchangeable as well as conflicting interests and goals. Competition and trade 
policies sometimes interact so closely that the very distinction between them becomes 
something of the least importance in terms of their economic meaning. For example, 
as it was mentioned in the Report of the Working Group on the Interaction between 
trade and competition policies to the General Council (1998), “antidumping may 
arguably be necessary to reduce distortions in international trade. But on the way of a 
single market being developed, bilateral trade of the signatories becomes more typical 
of domestic rather than international trade, and hence the retention of antidumping 
provisions in this context becomes anomalous. In any case, the accomplishment of 
free trade between two countries, by facilitating arbitrage, substantially reduced the 
incentives for and the ability of exporters to dump”.96 It should be added, however, 
that the problem is surely not confined to the retention of certain trade remedies in the 
arsenal of nation-states.  
                                                                                                                             
with the external effects of unilateral policy choices that creates a Prisoners’ Dilemma situation within 
the multilateral talks’ framework. 
96 WT/WGTCP/2, Page 23 
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On the way of growing economic interdependence, classical means of national trade 
policy are argued to become “outdated”, while approaches, traditionally perceived as 
instruments of domestic regulation and enforcement, are developing into the most 
appropriate tools for dealing on international arena. The conflict between economic 
efficiency and national sovereignty is unlikely to be resolved, and the growing 
number of regional trade agreements is an indirect indication of this phenomenon. 
 
Generally, competition policy is understood as a body of national antirust laws and 
other regulations aimed at achieving an overall efficiency of national industries as 
well as often a degree of economic fairness and equality of opportunities. National 
competition policies can differ in their specific emphasis on each of those goals hence 
the worldwide coordination is hardly possible in the near future. The fundamental 
problem with this global harmonization arises when a simple question is asked: 
whether the attainment of global efficiency and fairness is possible at all? And if not, 
what kind of role the harmonized global competition policy is supposed to play? And 
how should it influence the trade policy concerns? 
 
In sum, there are opposing views within the antitrust theory itself on what should be 
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regarded as an optimal and efficiency-enhancing competition policy in the open 
economy. Neoclassical economics suggest that competition and trade policies are 
interchangeable, and there is no need for competition policy coordination among 
trading partners. Cordato economics, on the contrary, establish the notion of dynamic 
competition as opposed to theoretically rather than practically defined “structural 
competition” and provide the alternative way for incorporating competition into the 
world trading system – through mutually accepted investment rules, primacy of 
intellectual property rights and remuneration on invested capital in order to prevent 
free-riding. 
 
Historically, current world trading system has already incorporated “structural 
approach” to competition. This is clearly seen in antidumping, anti-subsidies, 
safeguards and many other provisions that are concerned with the threat of foreign 
monopolization of the domestic market. Relatively underdeveloped area of 
interactions between trade and investments and other property rights concerns shows 
that the dynamic competition approach is beginning to arise as a viable alternative, 
but reshaping the existing trade system within new paradigm might be too costly, if 
even possible. Figures 1, 2, 2.1, 2.2, 3 provide a graphic interpretation of the point. 
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3. TRADE THEORY PERSPECTIVES 
 
3.1 The balance of concessions, “benefits accruing”, reciprocity, non-
discrimination 
 
In general different “trade perspectives” show that basic pillars of current world 
trading system were formed under the strong influence of “structural competition” 
approach, which makes competition policy concerns secondary with respect to trade 
policy and promotes interventionists attitudes toward antitrust regulation. 
 
Non-Discrimination 
 
Article I of the GATT prohibits discrimination among trading partners with respect to 
tariffs and other border charges as well as certain domestic taxes. There are two 
important exceptions: the authority in Article XXIV for the creation of preferential 
arrangements and Special & Differential Treatment (Enabling Clauses during the 
Tokyo Round)97.  
                                            
97 The following discussion is based on Economic Dimensions of International Law: Comparative and 
empirical perspectives, J. Bhandari, Alan O. Sykes, 1997; International Trade: Theory and Evidence, J. 
Markusen, J. Melvin and others (eds.), 1995; International trade, MiaMikic, 1998  
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What is the incentive to discriminate on the part of a particular importing nation in 
Nash equilibrium (taking the policies of other nations as fixed)? 
 
Discrimination to raise tariff revenues 
 
A “small” country that acts as a price taker in the international marketplace faces a 
perfectly elastic supply of imports from all sources at the world price. Any attempt to 
discriminate against any of the suppliers will cause them to sell elsewhere, since the 
domestic market of the “small” country is not large enough to cause any sufficient 
injury to those suppliers. If the goal is to raise revenue, then for a small country this 
kind of policy is pointless.  
 
For “large countries”, however, defined as nations that face an upward sloping import 
curve, the opportunity to exploit market power exists. In this case we can consider the 
country acting as a monopsonic nation. The “optimal tariff” will maximize national 
welfare taking into consideration other variables, such that the exchange rate and 
trade on other markets. 
Under the competitive supply conditions and taking a partial equilibrium view, the 
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ideal form of price discrimination for a government maximizing national welfare, will 
be to impose a distinct tariff for each unit of each imported good equal to the 
difference between its supply price (given its location on import supply curve) and the 
competitive market price. Such a policy would extract the whole producer surplus.  
The similar policy could be pursued by a nation, who is providing a protection for 
domestic industry. The importing nation would simply charge a tariff equal to the 
difference between the desired local price and the supply price for every unit of 
imports. Such policy would discriminate even not among countries but among 
producers. The discrimination can raise tax revenues. In general, the optimal system 
of discriminatory tariffs will tend to impose a greater one on exporting nations with a 
less elastic export supply curve, since producers in those nations will absorb more of 
the tariff through reduced prices than producers elsewhere.  
 
However, large countries would not be tempted (if permitted) to use discriminatory 
tariff policies as often as could be expected. Those policies will induce entry and exit 
responses over time and encourage entry by high-cost producers subject to low tariff 
and exit by more efficient producers, which are under the high tariffs. Therefore, in 
the long run this policy can reduce revenue. If a government of a country possesses 
knowledge about how to affect entry and exit over time trough varying in time tariff 
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policies, such a policy can hardly be implemented since it requires extraordinary 
amount of information and enormous implementation costs. One more factor is to 
determine the country of origin of the good. In the era of multinational production it is 
not clear how to implement those efficient discriminatory policies. 
 
Discrimination in cooperative agreement at the absence of transaction costs 
 
When nations are trying to act in a cooperative manner the situation is not so simple. 
Tariff discrimination in a multilateral setting can cause trade diversion (the higher-
cost producers can out-compete lower-cost ones thanks to the lower tariff rates), 
which results in deadweight losses. If all the trade partners are treated equally such 
deadweight losses do not occur, and this, other things being equal, enhances global 
welfare. On the other hand, it also can happen that a discriminatory reduction in tariffs 
can be more welfare improving than a policy of the maintenance of generally higher 
tariffs. The reason is that any tariff reduction would displace less efficient domestic 
producers with more efficient foreign ones (trade creation).  
 
However, the general welfare perspective presented above is not exhaustive. To 
provide a more comprehensive answer the introduction of political factors is 
necessary. Discrimination favors some producers and makes worse off others. To 
68 
exert any influence a producer group should also be well organized. Not all the groups 
can achieve it.  
 
Moreover, it appears that, if count all producer surpluses and government revenues as 
equally important discrimination is not always politically attractive. At any level of 
protection in an importing nation and under competitive conditions, a non-
discriminatory tariff will maximize the sum of foreign producer surplus and the 
revenue of the importing government. It happens due to the absence of deadweight 
loss.  
 
Lastly, nations creating an FTA or a Customs Union should make up their trade 
policies in such a manner to prevent the diversion of trade with non-member countries. 
The liberalization within the FTA or CU can be welfare enhancing but generally only 
if both countries had been administering prohibitive tariffs before the CU was 
organized. If at least one nation conducted trade with the non-member countries, the 
whole agreement may appear as trade divertive. It will finally reduce the sum of 
producer surplus and government revenues that could be achieved if tariff reduction 
were applied in a non-discriminatory manner. Thus, “permitted” under the GATT and 
WTO tariff discrimination is also not always helpful.  
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The problem with the above conclusions is that not all producer surpluses created are 
equal. It is well recognized that consumer surplus is less valuable politically as 
producer surplus. The same can be said about different producer surpluses as well. For 
example, integrated steel giants in US have been chronically experiencing the 
pressure from low prices on plate hot-rolled steel. The main constraint of the steel 
industry is that the production requires a lot of sunk investments in equipment and if 
sunk costs cannot be recouped the industry would be considerably better off with 
protection, other things being equal, than any other industry. Price increase resulted 
from protection is not likely to induce additional entry because of the high barriers to 
entry. Those producers have more compelling incentive to invest in trade protection 
than others.  
 
The same could be observed on the export side. An exporter will benefit more from 
the concession that allows him to recoup its sunk costs, than from the other 
concession that will produce a short period of supra competitive profits, but will be 
eroded very fast by the successive entry. The same logic applies when an exporter is 
suffering from the protectionist measures abroad. If the measure simply erodes his 
excessive profits it is less injurious than when an exporter is deprived from the 
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opportunity to recoup its sunk costs. In the latter case the exporting industry will most 
probably lobby its government for retaliation.  
 
There is an interest of workers as well. The workers in declining industries, who 
represent a kind of “specific factor” that could not be easily shifted to other industries, 
will behave analogously as firms with sunk costs. It is likely that workers in 
expanding industries will lobby less than those in declining ones.   
 
All those political factors have much to do with the long run tariff policies, but it is 
clear that if some nations adopt discriminatory trade policy, within an FTA, for 
instance, they would liberalize the whole body of trade between themselves, thus 
tending to injure the declining industries and benefit expanding sectors, which are 
already competitive in the world market. Hence representatives of declining industries 
would more likely to oppose this preferential arrangement. An exceptional case may 
exist when an FTA or CU are in fact trade divertive, making declining industries 
comparatively better off by providing a chance to out-compete more efficient 
producers from non-member countries.  
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Multilateral bargaining process with the presence of transaction costs 
 
MFN obligation may affect the transaction costs of the negotiations as well as the 
opportunities for strategic behavior in bargaining. In general, MFN helps to resolve 
one problem (protecting the value of concessions from future erosion), while 
exacerbating the other – free-riding. 
 
The problem of free-riding emerges, when several countries are interested in 
obtaining a trade concession from the same trade partner98. In this case everybody of 
them is inclined to underestimate his readiness to provide reciprocal trade concession 
in the hope that other interested parties will be more willing to pay. With this 
understanding in mind it is highly probable that a deal will not be struck.  
 
There exist alternative ways, but none of them is satisfactory. All parties interested in 
a deal can coordinate their offers in advance and put forward a collective offer. This 
procedure, however, could also be flawed with free-riding. Or the nations can 
abandon product-by-product procedure in favor of tariff cuts under the mutually 
accepted formula. Unfortunately, at the same time the nations are loosing the 
                                            
98 - WTO, Tariff Negotiations and Renegotiations under the GATT and the WTO 
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opportunity to reach politically optimal concessions and anyway have an incentive to 
deviate. Since it is impossible to eradicate totally a free-rider problem, there is no 
doubt that MFN prevents the parties from exhausting all possible political gains. 
Moreover, in a static setting of trade negotiation problem with the application of game 
theoretic approach it appears that, generally, tariff rates achieved with the application 
of MFN principle will be higher than those attained on a discriminatory basis (3T/2 
and T/2, where T is a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, when a tariff is set 
unilaterally).   In a dynamic setting the outcome is more favorable for the application 
of MFN, since in a discriminatory case a nation offering a concession will try to find a 
point, where its partners are indifferent between negotiating and abstaining from 
bargaining (only the costs of bargaining accrue to them). But in this situation trading 
partners of an offering nation would not be interested in negotiations very much, 
running the risk that concessions will not be granted and the whole trade system could 
be endangered. On the contrary, the application of MFN in dynamic setting provides 
all partners with more sufficient gains.  
 
There is one more possible solution to prevent free-riding. The pinpointing of a “like 
products” is really important in this case. It is not surprising that signatories to WTO 
and GATT have been trying to determine those like products, since it is directly 
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connected with the application of the MFN principle. On the one hand, the unduly 
narrow concept of the like product can totally eradicate the whole concept of MFN 
principle and all joint gains from avoiding trade diversion would be lost, on the other 
hand the unduly broad definition of a like product can exaggerate the free-rider 
problem immensely.  
 
Generally in a cooperative setting the MFN obligation has its advantages and 
disadvantages. The benefits are referred to the protection of the concessions that was 
made during the previous rounds of negotiations or with the different trading partners 
and to the increased joint political surplus. The costs are incurred through the free-
rider problem and through the limiting the plethora of opportunities to discriminate in 
circumstances, when it is actually more efficient (for example, in raising tariff 
revenue or when it might be valuable to benefit some politically powerful interest 
groups, such as declining industries). Additionally, the elimination of MFN principle 
from trade negotiations could impose additional costs due to the emergence of trade 
diversion.  
 
Reciprocity 
 
74 
According to Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger 99, there are two basic implications 
of reciprocity concept for GATT/WTO practice. Firstly, in the course of trade 
negotiations, the governments normally seek a “balance of concessions” (tariff 
cuts)100.  It is also mentioned that this insistence on reciprocity stands in a sharp 
contrast with the widely accepted reasoning, that unilateral free trade could be a best 
policy for a price-taking country (usually a small country). The seemingly irrelevant 
government policies could simply be explained by the cost-shifting influence of 
world-price101 movements, associated with their unilateral tariff choices. The only 
chance for the member-governments to achieve tariff reductions includes the 
establishment of a setting, which prevents the world price ratio from moving and 
alleviate trade-associated Prisoners’ dilemma. Although the reciprocity concept is 
broadly accepted by the Member governments, there is no such an obligation on 
reciprocity in the GATT. 
                                            
99 Kym Anderson, “Peculiarities of Retaliation in WTO dispute settlement”, World Trade Review 
(2002), 1: 2, 123-134 
100 Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, “An Economic Theory of GATT,” American Economic 
Review, XCIX, March 1999, pp. 215-248. 
101 World untaxed relative price presented by Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger as p=p*x/py, where p*x 
is export price of foreign producers of a good x and py is export price of a good y exported by domestic 
producers. Both prices are untaxed and represent world-price ratio. Interestingly, in this setting world-
price is determined on the basis of standard two-countries, two-goods model, which imply that in 
practice those two “reciprocal” goods should be determined, and only in this case the whole framework 
will work. It is actually unclear, what if the setting of reciprocity will include more goods, say one on 
the one side and two on the other, which in sum makes for a “balance of concessions”.    
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The second meaning of reciprocity concept is closely connected with renegotiation 
procedures within the WTO framework. All trading partners affected by withdrawal or 
change in previously agreed concessions are allowed to withdraw substantially 
equivalent concessions of their own.  
 
Having in place this both-direction mechanism presumably should help to enhance the 
probability of achieving politically efficient outcome, which would not be subject for 
renegotiation induced by one of the trading partners in the future. However, whether it 
is really the case in practice is yet to be seen, since the present analytical framework 
disregards the costs of renegotiation, which could be substantially higher than the 
benefits from renegotiation. Instead other policy options for concession withdrawal 
may apply, such as unilateral policy choices in the areas other than trade policy.  
 
Probably, governments often avoid legal procedures under the WTO directly because 
of this procedural inefficiency and time consuming nature, rather than because of 
their inclination toward “predatory” behavior.  
 
One more indispensable principle of trade negotiations is non-discrimination. It is 
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embodied in the GATT/WTO rules through Articles I (MFN) and III (National 
Treatment), as well as in some other complementary provisions of other WTO 
Agreements. Bagwell and Staiger actually show 102  that in proceeding to the 
multilateral setting the concept of non-discrimination is inseparable from attaining 
efficient outcome. MFN and national treatment clauses are designed to prevent the 
nullification and impairment of previously achieved concessions with other trading 
partners, and therefore should protect the whole framework from the systematic and 
endless renegotiation. “The complementary relationship between the principles of 
reciprocity and non-discrimination in generating efficient outcomes rests upon a 
simple intuition. The principle of reciprocity has the effect of neutralizing the world-
price effects of a government decision to raise tariffs, and so it can eliminate the 
externality that causes governments to make inefficient trade policy decisions 
provided that trade policy externality travels only through world prices.”103 
 
There are, however, some practical difficulties associated with the application of 
theoretical approach developed in the works on the economic implications of trade 
agreements, since trade theory usually uses very broad concepts in its explanations of 
                                            
102 Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, “An Economic Theory of GATT,” American Economic Review, XCIX, 
March 1999, pp. 215-248. 
103 Ibid 
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governments’ behavior, which stay far from the concerns of actual policy-makers. In 
“GATT-Think” piece Bagwell and Staiger introduce some explanations to this 
phenomenon104.  
 
According to their analysis, there are nowadays three basic approaches to 
understanding of agreed framework for international trade policy coordination. The 
appropriate question asked here is what is the purpose of a trade agreement? Why 
governments need to establish it? One motivation was already mentioned: the 
governments need to constrain the terms-of-trade externality to achieve Pareto-
improvement in their countries’ economic conditions. The explanations however are 
different a bit depending on which theory is applied.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
104 Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, “GATT-Think”, NBER Working Paper Series, WP 8005, 
November 2000 
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3.2 The Purpose of Trade Agreements 105 
 
Traditional Economic Approach 
 
This approach is comparatively old and well established. It was first clearly 
formalized in the works of Torrens (1844) and Mill (1844). Then it was developed 
further in a paper of Harry G. Johnson “Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation”106, where 
he first formalizes the terms-of-trade driven inefficiencies, using two hypotheses: 
governments can manipulate terms of trade and they seek to maximize domestic 
welfare. The main findings of this literature show that the non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium outcome of trade policy setting is indeed inefficient, since at this point the 
home and foreign iso-welfare contours are not tangent.107 Hence, as Johnson stresses, 
while neither country can improve its lot with unilateral deliberation of tariffs, each 
country can in principle be better off under the trade agreement, which provide some 
mechanism for alleviation of terms-of-trade related Prisoners’ Dilemma. 
 
                                            
105 The following discussion draws heavily on Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, “GATT-Think”, 
NBER Working Paper Series, WP 8005, November 2000 
106 Johnson, Harry G. (1953-54), “Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation,” Review of Economic Studies, 1.2, 
p.142-53. 
107 Formal derivation of this outcome is provided in Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, “GATT-
Think”, NBER Working Paper Series, WP 8005, November 2000. 
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The work of Mayer108 proved that the efficient tariff pairs in this framework satisfy 
the following relationship: τ = 1/τ*, where τ is a tariff rate of a home country, while 
τ* is a tariff rate of a foreign country109. These tariff pairs equalize local prices across 
countries and therefore achieve efficient worldwide outcome. The reciprocal free 
trade is among the efficient solutions, but it is not the only one. There is a set of 
efficient solutions, in which one country is taxing and the other is subsidizing imports. 
 
Bagwell and Staiger also stressed that the appealing feature of this model is clarity of 
international trade agreement’s potential role: it provides a framework to escape from 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. According to traditional economic approach, the only reason for 
governments to pursue unilateral policies leading to the Nash outcome is their ability 
to manipulate terms-of-trade, leading to the “zero-sum” game among governments. 
Trade agreement must guide the governments back to the ‘contract curve” solution, 
which represents in this case reciprocal free trade (as generally import subsidization 
rarely occurs). The explanation proposed by this approach is very unequivocal, but 
many economists repeatedly stress the unrealistic nature of underlying assumption of 
                                            
108 Mayer, Wolfgang (1981), “Theoretical Considerations on Negotiated Tariff Adjustments,” Oxford E
conomic Papers, 33, 135-53, cited from Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, “GATT-Think”, NBER 
Working Paper Series, WP 8005, November 2000. 
109  τ = (1+t), τ* = (1+t*), where t and t* is official tariff rates of home and foreign countries 
respectively. 
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a welfare-maximizing government unconstrained by domestic political motivations. 
 
Political Economy Approach  
 
In this setting governments care about the distribution of national income among 
domestic interest groups. The desired local price, implied by the tariff choice, should 
reflect not only economic efficiency, but also domestic political concerns. Within the 
political economy literature, one possibility of political influence on trade policy 
arises from the fact that government is a “product” of representative democracy. In 
this case, as Mayer (1984) shows, the government sets its trade policy to promote the 
interests of the median voter, whose utility can be represented as a function of local 
and world relative price. Additionally, as Baldwin110 observes, the major approaches 
to the political economy of trade policy, as represented in the work by Olson, Caves, 
Brock and Magee, Feenstra and Bhagwati, Findlay and Wellisz and Hillman, can also 
be represented in this way. Finally, the lobbying models of Grossman and Helpman fit 
within this understanding.111 
                                            
110 Baldwin, Robert (1985), The Political Economy of U.S. Import Policy, the MIT Press: Cambridge. 
111 Olson, Mancur (1965), The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press: Cambridge; Caves, 
Richard A. (1976), “Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada’s Tariff Structure,” Canadian Journ
al of Economics, 9, May, 278-300; Brock, William A. and Stephen P. Magee (1978), “The Economics o
f Special Interest Politics,” American Economic Review, 68, May, 246-50; Feenstra, Robert and Jagdish 
Bhagwati (1982), “Tariff Seeking and the Efficient Tariff,” in Jagdish Bhagwati, ed., Import Competitio
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One more possibility is a government motivated by some independent ideological 
concerns. This model (proposed by Baldwin) includes political support constraint. In 
this setting, for example, a government can be represented as a “free trader”, whose 
policy choices are limited by the necessity to mobilize exporters’ support in favor of 
free trade balanced by the inevitability to take into account import-competing 
industries’ resistance.  
 
Unilateral trade policies set by the governments in political economy understanding 
lead to the Nash equilibrium, which is assumed to be unique. It is also assumed that 
within the international trade agreement the governments seek to achieve Pareto-
improvement in their economic conditions, especially in increased volume of trade. A 
trade agreement should entail therefore the reciprocal trade liberalization and lower 
than Nash tariffs. The Nash equilibrium derived from political economy model is 
                                                                                                                             
n and Response, University of Chicago Press: Chicago; Findlay, Ronald and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982), 
“Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfare,” in Jagdish Bhagwati, e
d., Import Competition and Response, University of Chicago Press: Chicago; Grossman, Gene M. and 
Elhanan Helpman (1994), “Protection for Sale,” American Economic Review, 84, September, 833-50; 
Grossman, GeneM. and Elhanan Helpman (1995), “TradeWars and Trade Talks,” Journal of Political 
Economy , 03, August, 675-708. 
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indeed inefficient. The condition that trade agreement (or actually tariffs set under 
some specified circumstances) must be on the efficiency frontier is not met.112  
 
The overall outcome, though, is not very much different from the traditional economic 
approach to trade theory. The essential difference of political economy approach is 
that it allows the efficient solutions to correspond to the broader set of potential 
outcomes, not only free trade. It also includes the high probability of two countries 
taxing their imports as a politically efficient solution. Political considerations explain 
why unilateral and bilateral free trade policy is so rarely found in the real world and 
hardly a goal of a majority of trade agreements. Apart from that political economy 
approach adds little to the understanding of the purpose of multilateral trade 
agreements: their only goal is still to alleviate terms-of-trade Prisoners’ Dilemma.  
 
There is also one more important detail in the course of this discussion: the 
interpretation of the terms-of-trade externality, especially in its practical application. 
At the broadest level, the whole discussion above confirms a very simple notion: 
governments can gain from trade-policy cooperation, if otherwise each would try to 
shift costs of more protectionist trade policy on the other, resulting in globally 
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inefficient tariff choices. Terms-of-trade externality is a mean of shifting those costs. 
As Bagwell and Staiger stress there should be formulated an alternative interpretation 
of terms-of-trade externality, more relevant for the practical use.  
 
The unilateral tariffs are inefficient for a plausible reason: the domestic government 
does not internalize the harm for foreign exporters that its import tariff implies. The 
larger the importing economy and the bigger monopsonistic power it represents, the 
more devastating the harm to foreign exporters is, since they have to lower their 
export price to a greater extent. In turn this leads to the deterioration of the foreign 
country’s terms of trade. Moreover, when the domestic government raises a tariff, it 
simultaneously shifts in the market demand curve, which in reality epitomizes the 
main subject of trade negotiations – market access. The practical implications of these 
conclusions will be discussed in the next section. “Indeed, we may interpret “cost-
shifting”, “terms-of-trade gain” and “market access restriction” as three phases that 
describe the single economic experience that occurs when the domestic government 
raises its import tariff and restricts foreign access to its market.”113  
 
 
                                            
113 Ibid 
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The Commitment Approach 
 
This is a third approach to the study of trade agreements. It was proposed in the works 
of Carmichael, Staiger and Tabellini, Gruenspecht, Lapan, Maskin and Newberry, 
Matsuyama, Tornell, Devereaux, Brainard, Mayer, McLaren, Grossman and Maggi, 
Maggi and Rodriguez, Krishna and Mitra114. 
 
The commitment approach centers on the game between each government and its 
private sector. In this setting a government makes its policy decision and after that 
agents in private sector chose their production levels or/and investment volumes. The 
main point here is that a government could have too much flexibility in setting its 
                                            
114 Carmichael, C. (1987), “The Control of Export Credit Subsidies and its Welfare Consequences,” Jou
rnal of International Economics, 23, 1-19; Staiger, Robert W. and Guido Tabellini (1987), “Discretiona
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K. (1988), “Dumping and Dynamic Competition,” Journal of International Economics, 25, 225-248; L
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trade policies, so if it makes policy decisions before the private sector determines 
production levels, it should take into consideration both producer and consumer 
options. Therefore, a government prefers to discharge policy adjustments after 
producers set up their variables in order to limit further control only to consumers’ 
behavior, such that the tariffs would not affect production. The problem with this 
sequence arises when there is a possibility of information leakage or private actors 
can understand government incentives at least reasonably well. Producers anticipating 
certain governmental actions can, therefore incorporate them into their business 
strategies and the whole work of an economy becomes distorted. The distortion in 
production decisions is the cost of too flexible trade policy.  
 
Within this framework the welfare-improving role of a trade agreement includes the 
possibility for the government to commit to its preferred tariff, determined after the 
production decisions are made. The commitment role of a trade agreement is different 
from the terms-of-trade considerations.  
 
Maggi and Rodriguez115 offer the following model of the commitment approach. They 
focus on the small-country case, where terms-of-trade externality is eliminated. There 
                                            
115 Maggi, Giovanni and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998), “The Value of Trade Agreements in the Prese
nce of Political Pressures,” Journal of Political Economy, 106.3, 574-601. 
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is a possibility for one of domestic sectors to form a lobby, and it is assumed that a 
government values the contributions of the lobby. 116  “The political process can 
potentially distort the equilibrium allocation of resources: the politically organized 
sector may be larger than it would become under the free trade, as firms invest in this 
sector in order to enjoy the protection that their contributions to the lobbying induce. 
This distortion in turn can give the government an incentive to commit to free trade, 
and it is assumed that the government can accomplish this by joining a pre-constituted 
free-trade agreement.” 117  With the help of this commitment a government can 
ultimately achieve the reallocation of distorted investments into the most efficient 
economic sectors, while there is a cost of this commitment for the government: the 
foregone contributions from the lobby. Whether the government chooses a free-trade 
commitment depends on the special features of the political process. Firstly, the 
position of the government vis-à-vis the lobby should not be very strong, so that it 
could not extract too significant rents from the lobby.  Secondly, the government’s 
responsiveness to contributions relative to the goal of increasing national welfare118 
should not be too high or too low. If it is high the commitment is not likely to be 
                                            
116 In the same way as it was formalized in the model of Grossman-Helpman in Grossman, Gene M. an
d Elhanan Helpman (1994), “Protection for Sale,” American Economic Review, 84, September, 833-50. 
117 Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, “GATT-Think”, NBER Working Paper Series, WP 8005, 
November 2000 
118 This is still assumed an important factor, determining in part the dynamics of electoral activity along 
with the contributions from various lobbying groups.  
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credible (the government is too reluctant to forego political contributions). If it is low 
the investment distortions are in any event not too catastrophic.  
 
This is not the only commitment problem that a government could face, of course. In 
accordance with the Matsuyama’s model119, a government could be interested in the 
lifting of protection of some industry, once an industry invests sufficiently in cost 
reduction. If the government presumes that the protection would not be lifted in case 
the cost reduction or some additional investments do not occur, the commitment 
problem arises, since the private sector can reasonably well anticipate or acquire (due 
to corruption of state apparatus) the information about future governmental actions. 
Thus, the unintentional disclosure of information could undermine government’s 
commitment to facilitate industry’s restructuring through private sector’s deliberate 
abstention from necessary investments, capacity reduction and staff optimization to 
ensure, that government will not have an incentive to lift trade protection ex-post.  
 
If government is not strong enough to commit to industry reforms by itself, it could 
use a trade policy to achieve credibility of the commitment. A trade agreement 
actually can serve this purpose since country’s trading partners possess enough power 
                                            
119 Matsuyama, Kiminori (1990), “Perfect Equilibria in a Trade Liberalization Game,” American Econo
mic Review, June, 480-92. 
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to credibly threaten trade retaliation if trade liberalization does not occur. Whence 
trade liberalization becomes a preferred strategy for the government even if industry’s 
restructuring and investments do not take place, which in turn forces import-
competing industries to restructure. However, the scheme proposed by Matsuyama is 
unlikely to hold in every case. First of all, for self-fulfilling domestic restructuring to 
occur, considerable financial flows should exist within the industry. Next, the industry 
under reckoning should be potentially competitive, so that the future benefits would 
outweigh current costs. If the industry is a sunset one without any hope even after 
restructuring, its representatives are likely to lobby in the government for the 
alternative means of protection, since otherwise it is doomed to die. If the sector is big 
enough and politically sensitive, the probable outcome could include lax competition 
policy (exemptions), subsidization or other regulations. At last, the size of the 
industry within the country in comparison with its foreign competitors also matters, as 
well as the bargaining power of the home country. 
 
In sum, the commitment approach provides a distinct purpose for the existence of 
multilateral trade agreement by suggesting that such coordinating agreements can 
supply governments with the additional tools in strategic games with their own 
private sectors. Interestingly, according to the Bagwell and Staiger’s view, none of the 
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approaches imply distinct political considerations as an indispensable part.120 They 
also come to the conclusion that competition policy and trade policy are substitutable 
tools for regulating the degree of market access and that governments should regulate 
international trade only through “international instruments” – tariffs leaving 
competition policy for strictly domestic usage. 
 
Political factors, however, matter in defining broader political motivations that 
political economy models capture. “This conclusion carries with a fundamentally 
different modeling implication, as it suggests that the (politically augmented) terms-
of-trade and commitment theories provide the necessary building blocks for a 
modeling framework with which to interpret and evaluate GATT and its features.”121 
 
Alternative and Complementary Approaches: Informational Role 
 
The purposes for the establishment of a multilateral trade agreement listed above are 
not exhaustive. There is another potential role of the WTO, which actually does not 
contradict the previously delineated functions. As it was mentioned by Thomas 
                                            
120 Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, “GATT-Think”, NBER Working Paper Series, WP 8005, November 
2000 
121 Ibid 
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Hungerford and Dan Kovenoch and Marie Thursby 122 , the dispute settlement 
procedure may also act as an information-gathering agency that is able to discern 
between true violations of the agreement and mistaken perceptions, thus facilitating 
the use of bilateral reputation mechanism to support cooperation123. The emphasis 
here is on bilateral monitoring, since the dispute settlement can improve monitoring 
by the country directly affected by the trade policy. 
 
In addition Maggi124 concentrates on two other roles that WTO dispute settlement can 
perform. First, it can verify violations of the agreement and inform third countries, 
thus facilitating multilateral enforcement efforts. Second, it can promote a multilateral 
rule-making procedure in place f a web of bilateral negotiations. The emphasis on 
two-countries models in the papers mentioned above precludes them from capturing 
these functions.  
 
The idea underlying the potentially important informational role, distinguished by 
Maggi, is as follows. Suppose country A commits a violation against country B, and 
                                            
122 Hungerford, Thomas, “GATT: A Cooperative Equilibrium in a Non-Cooperative Trading Regime?”, Journal of 
International Economics, November 1991, 31 (3-4), pp. 357-69; Kkovenoch, Dan and Thursby, Marie, “GATT, 
Dispute Settlement and Cooperation”, Economics and Politics, March 1993, 4 (1), pp. 151-70   
123 Giovanni Maggi, “The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation”, The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 89, No. 1. (Mar., 1999), pp. 190-214 
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this violation is observed by country B, but not by the rest of the trading community. 
The role of the dispute settlement system in this case is to identify the violation and 
bring it to the attention of other WTO Members, exposing the offending country to 
the loss of reputation in the trading community. In this case the monitoring is 
undertaken not only by the involved countries, but by the third parties as well. The 
second important function of dispute settlement arises, when a violating Member is 
placed under the risk to lose the cooperation of other Member-countries.  
 
There are several ways in which WTO community can respond o a violation of the 
Agreements. Firstly, WTO Members can withdraw trade concessions to the defecting 
country. For example, in the interpretation provided by several scholars125, Article 
XXIII of the GATT Agreement provides for the possibility of repeatedly offending 
country from the GATT. 126  Secondly, WTO Members can impose costs on the 
offending government in more subtle ways, by withdrawing some of their “goodwill” 
toward that government. WTO Members can be less forthcoming with the offending 
                                            
125 John Jackson, 1969, pp. 186 – 187; Michael Finger, 1993 (?), cited from Giovanni Maggi, “The Role of 
Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No. 1. 
(Mar., 1999), pp. 190-214 
126 Despite the fact, that in theory this possibility exists, it sees a bit unlikely to occur in practice, since 
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between countries, notwithstanding the fact that they can periodically violate the Agreements, see or 
example, Kym Anderson, “Peculiarities of Retaliation in WTO dispute settlement”, World Trade Review (2002), 
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government in subsequent negotiations, in the same or related areas of cooperation; 
they can be more reluctant to enter new agreements with the offending country. If 
trade liberalization takes place in a gradual fashion, third countries can slow down the 
liberalization process vis-à-vis the offending government. Also, third countries can 
reduce their cooperation with the offending country at the level of institutional 
procedures. For example, if country A does not follow the recommendations of a 
Panel or the Appellate Body, third countries may feel free to do the same in the 
subsequent disputes against country A. 
 
However, the second option presented by Maggi127 seems rather implausible, since it 
places under doubt the existence of WTO dispute settlement as such. The main 
meaning of WTO dispute settlement constitutes the limitations imposed on unlawful 
and discretionary actions by governments in trade policy area, notwithstanding the 
number of previous violations made by some of them. Those “non-cooperative” 
actions from the third countries toward a violator could be traced in the application of 
non-tariff barriers, which include among others competition, environmental and trade 
policy requirements, but this issue demands additional research.  
 
                                            
127 Anyhow, Maggi considers them as potential 
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Anyway, the statistics of trade disputes witnesses that among the most common 
violators of WTO Agreements, who even triggered retaliation against themselves, are 
the major participants – US and EU. Their exclusion from the WTO is really unlikely. 
The problem of confidence exists, nevertheless, but the line goes between developed 
and developing countries, in such a way that functions mentioned by Maggi can be 
actually utilized, but only in one direction. In reality developed countries can become 
less cooperative towards developing countries, which in turn may behave in the same 
way, but would never achieve the same results due to the power imbalances. The 
failure of Cancun Ministerial emphasizes that this threat actually persists. As it was 
pointed out by some WTO commentators, probably the main cause deterring even 
strong countries from the outright violations of WTO rules is the fear of a systematic 
breakdown in multilateral cooperation.128  
 
Moreover, further in his article Maggi says: “with regard to the role of multilateral 
punishment threats, the model129 shows that a multilateral mechanism of enforcement 
is desirable, but third-party sanctions should be “minimal”. [They] should be 
                                            
128 Ex-Director General of GATT Arthur Dunkel, for example, repeatedly pointed on this feature   
129 Model employed in Giovanni Maggi, “The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade 
Cooperation”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No. 1. (Mar., 1999), pp. 190-214 
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threatened only for certain violations, namely those that are hard to deter with 
bilateral sanctions alone.”130 
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3.3 Trade Policy Tools 
 
Trade Negotiations 
 
The purpose of trade agreement is not the only question we should ask about it. A 
fundamental question that remains is how governments might configure their 
negotiations? Negotiations between governments are intended to move their trade 
policy decisions from the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium to the contract curve. 
“There is no a- priopri reason to expect that governments would choose a political 
optimum, because political optimum over any other point on the contract curve, and 
indeed, the outcome ultimately depends on the structure of negotiations.” 131   
Jackson 132  distinguishes between “power-based” and “rules-based” approaches to 
trade negotiations.  
 
When seeking a reciprocal trade agreement, governments require an approach to 
negotiations, which serves to move tariffs from the inefficient disagreement point to 
                                            
131 Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, “GATT-Think”, NBER Working Paper Series, WP 8005, November 
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132 Jackson, John (1997), The World Trading System, 2nd edition, The MIT Press: Cambridge, pp. 109-
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the contract curve. One possibility here is a “power-based” approach, when the 
governments bargain over tariffs in a direct fashion that is not determined by any rules. 
The Nash Bargaining Solution can induce the politically optimal tariffs only if the 
countries are symmetric. If the domestic country is relatively more powerful of the 
two, such that its benefits in Nash equilibrium without trade agreement is always 
more than that in the political optimum. 133   As such, power based approach to 
negotiating trade agreements would lead to the tariff choices on the contract curve, 
and any divergence in these outcomes from the political optimum could be said to 
reflect “power asymmetries” across negotiating partners.  
 
An approach adopted by the countries under the GATT Agreements, however, is not 
power-based avenue. There is a certain set of rules, written as well as implicit, 
underlying trade negotiation procedures among countries. The main purpose of the 
GATT rules in this setting is therefore to eliminate power asymmetries among 
Member countries in such a way that leads to the politically optimal tariffs. 
 
 
                                            
133 If the home country is more “powerful”, its satisfies the following agreement: (Wpo – WN)/(- Wpopw) < (Wpo* – 
WN*)/(W*popw), where Wpo- domestic country’s welfare in “political optimum”, WN- domestic country’s welfare in 
Nash equilibrium, Wpo*, WN* - the same for the foreign government 
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 As Bagwell and Staiger put it, the question could be formulated even more starkly: 
“Do GATT rules serve to induce large countries to behave as if they were small 
countries, and thereby guide the outcome of trade negotiations toward political 
optimum?”134  
 
The Enforcement of the WTO Agreements 
 
The enforcement problem constitutes the most important challenge for sustainability 
of any international trade agreement. As soon as the agreement is signed, all Member-
governments faces the short-term incentive to increase the protection of domestic 
import-competing sectors at more than efficient rate in order to reap terms-of-trade 
gains. Thus an enforcement procedure, which includes punishments for deviating 
governments, is indispensable for any long-standing trade agreement.  
 
The enforcement procedure comprises the equivalent withdrawal of concessions: on 
the voluntary basis (compensation) or as a sequence of trade retaliation. In fact, tariffs 
that governments achieve through the trade negotiations should ideally represent on 
the one hand a politically optimal outcome, and on the other hand, they should fulfill 
                                            
and Robert W. Staiger, “GATT-Think”, NBER Working Paper Series, WP 8005, November 2000 
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the requirement of being balanced between the short-term gains of deviation and long-
term loss from potential retaliation of other trading partners. In this case, a trade 
agreement could be “self-enforcing”.  
 
In reality, however, accomplished multilateral tariff choices must not necessarily be 
fully efficient from economic and political point of view. They should provide Pareto-
improvement in welfare for both governments comparing with non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium, but power distortions may persist. Moreover, the balance, once achieved, 
may subsequently be upset as underlying features of the trading environment may 
change, and attempts to rebalance the agreement may arise. 
 
If viewed under the repeated games’ framework135, the formal enforcement approach 
taken by repeated-game literature is broadly consistent with the views within the 
WTO system itself.  
 
                                            
135 As it was suggested in the works of McMillan, John (1986), Game Theory in International Economi
cs, Harwood: New York; Dixit, Avinash (1987), “Strategic Aspects of Trade Policy,” in Truman F. Bewl
ey, ed., Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, Cambridge University Press: New York; 
Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger (1990), “A Theory of Managed Trade,” American Economic Revi
ew, 80, September 1990, 779-95. 
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There is an enforcement dilemma in the WTO: on the one side, it is designed to 
achieve the primary goal of any enforcement system – protection of an agreement 
from disintegration. On the other side, retaliatory withdrawals of concessions should 
not upset the equilibrium world price, which provided for the reciprocal concessions 
in the first place. To achieve a satisfactory trade-off is actually not that easy: 
punishment implies a withdrawal that could be greater or smaller than a violation, but 
unequal withdrawal would inevitably disturb the world relative price. Therefore, a 
multilateral trade agreement cannot be enforced at full: periodical violations are 
inevitable. 
 
The second challenge to the trading system is the robustness of initial reciprocal 
granting of concessions, which establishes the “agreed” world price. There is no 
obvious consensus on what kind of endogenous as well as exogenous factors can 
influence the efficiency of initially agreed world relative price or more precisely – the 
import demand curves of trading partners. 
 
 Here the interrelation between trade and “global” competition policy arises: 
international cartels capable to fix prices across the borders can influence the world 
price directly irrespectively of competition policies that national governments adopt.   
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From this perspective the difference between labor and environmental policies versus 
competition policy is becoming clear: the former two are unable to influence world 
price directly and independently, and therefore would not necessarily require the 
adoption of international standards.  
 
Equivalent Withdrawal of Concessions: Flawed Nature of Retaliation 
 
Are there any difference in the concepts of equivalent withdrawal of concessions and 
retaliation? The answer is a yes. Retaliation has in the first place something to do with 
the enforcement of a trade agreement, while an equivalent withdrawal of concessions 
could be practiced as a tool for re-balancing an agreement should the trade 
environment change.  
 
The use of retaliation under the WTO is not frequent. Nevertheless, recent dynamic 
shows that forceful withdrawals will potentially be used more frequently in the future.  
 
The first two uses of retaliation occurred in the late 1990s (Bananas and Hormones 
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cases)136 and involved two largest WTO members: the United States and the European 
Union.  The latest case of retaliation occurred in 2003 in conjunction with the 
safeguard measures imposed by the United States on steel imports. Among the 
complainants were the European Communities as well. Fortunately, the trade war did 
not erupt, since President Bush ended safeguard measures 76 months ahead of 
schedule137.  
 
The World Trade Organization had ruled the temporary steel safeguards illegal in a 
decision upheld on appeal138. Maintaining the tariffs would have discredited the group, 
undermined international trade agreements, and provoked retaliation.  
 
                                            
136 European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas: Recourse 
to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/AB/R, 9 April, 
Geneva: World Trade Organization, 1999; European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale 
and Distribution of Bananas: Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 
of the DSU, WT/DS27/AB/RECU, 24 March, Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2000; European 
Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones): Recourse to Arbitration by 
the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of DSU (US complaint), WT/DS26/AB/R, 12 July, 
Geneva: World Trade Organization, 1999   
137 Bob Tippee, “Bush makes right move with the end to steel safeguards”, Oil & Gas Journal, 15 
December, 2003, Vol. 101, Issue 48, page 80    
138 Jeffrey Sparshott, “Pressure Mounts for US to Repeal tariffs on Steel”, Knight Ridder Tribune 
Business News, Washington: Nov. 12, 2003, page 1; “Japan calls for Immediate end to US Steel 
Safeguards”, Jiji Press English News Service. Tokyo: Nov 20, 2003. p. 1; “Bush Weighs Softer Stance 
on Steel; Compromise on U.S. Tariffs Is Pondered as WTO Edict Opens Way to Retaliation”, Wall 
Street Journal, New York, Nov, 12, 2003, pg. A.2. 
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The European Union was ready to impose $2.2 billion worth of sanctions on US 
products selected to impose maximum political damage on the US president unwilling 
to look beyond steel-producing states. Japan planned sanctions worth $100 
million/year. In the US, according to some analysts, the tariffs were hurting steel 
consumers more than they were helping steel producers.  
 
For Bush, political metrics of the decision couldn't have been clearer. Hanging tough 
with tariffs would have played well in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. With 
steel unions already supporting Democratic challengers, though, the prize for Bush 
was limited. And it would have come at the cost of higher-than-necessary steel prices 
throughout the US, retaliation from Europe and Asia, and general horror over the 
implicit renunciation of trade. Thus, the threat of retaliation seems to be helpful in this 
case. There are, however, some peculiarities in existing WTO dispute settlement 
system that make it inherently unfair and inefficient from the economic point of view. 
Those features are discussed next in more detail.  
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The procedure for retaliation is as follows139. In case a WTO dispute settlement Panel 
finds that some member country’s policy is inconsistent with the WTO Agreements in 
general and with member’s commitments in particular, there is a “reasonable period 
of time” that is allowed for bringing the measure into conformity.140 In practice the 
period provided for the reforming of a measure could constitute from 3 to 15 month. 
If a member has failed to make appropriate changes into its policy, the respondent 
should start negotiations with the complainant to designate a mutually acceptable 
compensation. If no satisfactory agreement occurs within 20 days after the expiration 
of the “reasonable period of time”, a complainant has the right to ask the WTO’s 
Dispute Settlement Body for authorization of retaliation or for “suspension of 
concessions” in WTO language141.  The determination of the amount of retaliation is 
usually referred to the Arbitrator, unless there is an agreement on the issue between 
the complainant and respondent, and he assigns it within 60 days after the end of the 
“reasonable period of time”.142 The main goal of the Arbitrator is to decide whether 
the proposed level of retaliation is equal to the damage done by the original measure 
under consideration. The decision of the Arbitrator is final: there is no appeal option 
                                            
139 Kym Anderson, “Peculiarities of Retaliation in WTO dispute settlement”, World Trade Review (2002), 1:2, 
123-134; Giovanni Maggi, “The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation”, The 
American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No. 1. (Mar., 1999), pp. 190-214. 
140 Article 21.3 of DSU 
141 Article 22.2 of DSU 
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or the opportunity to seek a second arbitration. The DSB will accept the arbitration 
and grant the right to retaliate to the complainant, unless there is a consensus not to do 
so.143 
 
Among others Kym Anderson clearly finds that there is an apparent procedural 
dilemma in this retaliation procedure. “Suppose that the respondent takes the full 
“reasonable period of time” before announcing a reform of the offending policy 
measure. If the complainant believes that the reform is insufficient to make the policy 
WTO consistent, there is an opportunity to refer the matter to the Panel again. The 
Panel in turn must report within 90 days of that request.144  If the respondent is 
unhappy with the Panel’s ruling, another 45 days could be required for the Appellate 
Body to reconsider the decision. The apparent dilemma is that even if the Panel or 
Appellate Body finds the policy to be still WTO inconsistent, the 20 days after the 
“reasonable period of time” for a complainant to lodge a request to retaliate will have 
expired. This interpretation of DSU Articles 21.5 and 22 suggests there could be an 
endless loop for litigation.”145 
                                                                                                                             
142 Article 22.6 of DSU 
143 Article 22.7 of DSU 
144 Article 21.5 of DSU 
145 Kym Anderson, “Peculiarities of Retaliation in WTO dispute settlement”, World Trade Review (2002), 1:2, 
123-134 
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Enforcement and Retaliation146 
 
The dispute resolution procedures of the WTO allow sanctions to be imposed when a 
country is unwilling to bring a WTO-inconsistent measure into conformity with the 
rules. Unfortunately, the retaliation itself has some undesirable economic features. 
The provision to retaliate and rules for doing so involve an apparent procedural 
dilemma. After the DSB grant the authority to retaliate or “suspend concessions”, the 
parties have a chance to agree on the amount of retaliation. Should the respondent 
object to the amount of suspension proposed by the complainant, the matter is referred 
to the Arbitrator.  
 
The task of the Arbitrator under Article 22.7 of DSU is to find out whether the level of 
retaliation proposed is “equivalent” to the level of damage or “nullification or 
impairment”. The decision made by the Arbitrator and cannot be appealed. The type 
of retaliation most commonly considered is the list of products exported by the 
                                            
146 See, Joost Pauwelyn, “Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules-Toward a 
More Collective Approach”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 94, Issue 2 (April., 
2000), 335 – 347; Kym Anderson, “Peculiarities of Retaliation in the WTO Dispute Settlement”, 
World Trade Review (2002), 1:2, 123-134; Wifred J. Ethier, “Punishments and Dispute Settlement in 
Trade Agreements: The Equivalent Withdrawal of Concessions”, Department of Economics, 
University of Pennsylvania, manuscript, First version January 16, 2000, current printing April 25, 2002 
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respondent on which complainant will impose prohibitive tariffs. The gross value of 
imports to be prohibited (the average for the three most recent representative years for 
which the import data are available) should match the value of complainant’s exports 
excluded by the respondent’s measure, inconsistent with the rules of WTO.  
 
However, there is a problem with this equivalence. The assurance that the gross value 
of retaliation is equal to the gross value of injury incurred by the complainant due to 
the respondent’s measure does not mean that retaliation has the same economic 
welfare effect on the respondent that the measure initially had on the complainant’s 
welfare. 
 
Bilateral trade provides certain leverage for both parties to retaliate, but those 
opportunities are distributed unequally in accordance with the distribution of 
“economic power”, and the severity of retaliation will depend on the elasticity of 
world demand, country’s domestic demand and other country’s domestic supply. 
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Consider the chart below: 
CHART 1: ENFORECEMENT AND RETALIATION - 1 
 
 
Where Sr is a respondent’s excess supply curve; Dc is the complainant’s import 
demand curve; Dw is the world import demand for it. The assumption of this model is 
perfect competition and the absence of other distortions.  
 
The quantity of a good traded at the world’s price is Qw from which Qc goes to the 
complainant. Now that the retaliation occurs the quantity Qc accruing to the 
complainant’s market is eliminated, but it induces the decrease of world demand for 
respondent’s exports to Qw’, that means the fall in world demand is less than Qc. The 
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gross value of imports to be prohibited is the area PbQcO, whereas the respondent’s 
net loss because of that prohibition is the area PeQwdQw’P’. The respondent’s 
domestic welfare loss because of that trade prohibition is just an area of PedP’. The 
part under the supply curve represents the costs of production and they are saved, 
since production does not occur. 
The loss of domestic welfare by the respondent will depend on the elasticity of its 
excess supply as well as on the elasticity of complainant’s demand for imports and the 
elasticity of world demand for those imports as a whole.  
 
Consider the following graph: 
CHART 2: ENFORCEMENT AND RETALIATION - 2 
 
109 
 
See, that even in this case the value of imports prohibited due to retaliation is more 
than the welfare loss in the respondent country. In general the economic loss of the 
respondent is larger absolutely, and relative to the gross value of trade curtailed, the 
steeper (and less elastic) is the respondent’s supply curve. We can also infer from the 
graph that the less elastic the world demand for those exports (due to the absence of 
close substitutes or the limited number of suppliers) and the more elastic the 
complainant’s import demand (may be thanks to specific consumer preferences), the 
more injurious retaliation will be. This is quite intuitive, since the more respondent’s 
exports designated for retaliation go to the complainant, the more efficient retaliation 
will be, since respondent can use its monopsonistic power. Remarkably, the retaliation 
against a monopolistic respondent is unlikely to be effective. 
 
In the model presented above, the possibility of the oligopolistic structure of the world 
market is ruled out (the assumption of perfect competition). If the oligopoly is indeed 
the case, a chance to use strategic policy exists. For example, the prohibition of 
imports from the respondent, when there are only two or three main competitors in the 
world, will considerably improve the relative position of respondent’s competitors 
even if the gross loss of domestic welfare is not that big. However, again the 
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complainant should possess at least a certain degree of monopsonistic power.  
 
All those considerations have underscored the point that insuring the reduction in the 
value of imports from the respondent, due to retaliation, matches the reduction in the 
value of imports from the complainant, thanks to the WTO-inconsistent measure used 
by the former.  
 
This retaliation is not costless to the complainant either. Cost stems from choosing to 
forego the imports from the respondent, which actually could be the cheapest. Thus, 
retaliation, as the case of any discriminatory tariff setting can do, can cause trade 
diversion and misallocation of resources. The economic cost is smaller the flatter (or 
more elastic due to the presence of close substitutes) is Dc (which was shown in the 
graph). The injury for the complainant could be offset somewhat by the trade with 
producers of close substitutes, but this quantity was necessarily be smaller, since 
otherwise the complainant would elect to trade with them at the first place.  
 
The political sensitivity of the target product is likely to be the key point in choosing 
it. We should expect increased political sensitivity in sectors that incurred significant 
sunk cost and currently are struggling from the fall in world prices. Obviously, for 
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them the foreclosure of any external market could be especially detrimental. 
Unfortunately, the most troubled sectors tend to be in import-substitution. Hence it is 
not clear whether the complainant can actually find the sector, which is sensitive 
enough at the first place and which exports a considerable amount of output to its 
market. The problem is even more difficult if a complainant is a small country, which 
does not possess market power. 
 
Thus, trade loss equivalence would never translate into equivalent damage to 
economic welfare, except by coincidence. Additionally a complainant will lose 
economically during the retaliation period from the import restrictions it imposes on 
the respondent’s trade. The retaliation by its very nature contradicts the principle of 
trade liberalization. On the other hand it could induce additional compliance from the 
members and stop them from deviation.  
 
The concept of equivalence rests also on the notion of fairness. But in the context of 
WTO it is violated at least at four respects. First, past practices inconsistent with 
WTO and damaging for the complainant respondent’s measures go uncompensated. 
Second, the complainant economy is not helped, but harmed by retaliation, which is 
the standard cost of protectionist barriers. For small or developing economies, 
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confronted with much larger trader, it could be a particularly difficult situation. The 
large country may deter a small one seeking recourse to DSU. In other case, when the 
Arbitrator has ruled in favor of a small country, the big one can simply adopt 
retaliation. Third, retaliation does nothing to help an export industry in the injured 
country. Due to the imposition of retaliatory prohibitive tariffs, the import-competing 
industries of the complainant enjoy a temporary assistance. Fourth, the respondent’s 
industries that are harmed by the retaliation are not those that have been benefiting 
from the WTO-inconsistent measure. They are typically chosen on the basis of 
political sensitivity.  
 
For non-exporting Member, the situation with retaliation is even more detrimental. 
Although the Panel ruled in its favor, it cannot retaliate in practice, since it does not 
have any concessions to suspend (it does not export to the respondent, and in 
accordance with the principle of reciprocity, it did not give any concessions to the 
respondent). So the retaliation can hardly be implemented in practice by a small 
country. 
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3.4 The GATT / WTO legal practice and competition policy considerations: 
market access revisited 
 
The concept of market access – the common place in trade and competition policies 
 
Within neoclassical economics “market access” is usually associated with the import 
demand curve, which is becoming available for foreign suppliers when tariffs are 
reduced or regulations are lifted147. The obvious problem with this definition is that it 
is too vague to be readily applicable in practice. Moreover, there is another problem. 
In the WTO legal practice it has clearly identified that the Contracting Parties make 
reciprocal concessions to each other, but “the commitments they exchange in 
negotiations are commitments on conditions of competition for trade, not on 
volumes of trade”148. In this regard we should clearly distinguish between the concept 
of market access as an import demand curve and “the possibility to compete for trade” 
along with domestic and foreign firms from other countries without any 
discrimination. Thus, the concept of market access deserves further elaboration. In the 
Figure 1 the underlying concepts are presented in a graphic fashion. 
                                            
147 Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger generally argue that the effects of tariff reductions and other policies’ 
liberalization are similar and interchangeable.  
148 EC – Oilseeds I (GATT), Report of the Panel, L/6627 – 37S/86, 25 January 1990, para. 150 
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The main purpose of the trade agreement identified by Kyle Bagwell and Robert 
Staiger is to prevent the governments from setting unilateral trade policies. It reads: 
“Government A’s calculus of winners and losers neglects an important party: the 
exporters from country B. Exporting firms would naturally be expected to bear some 
of the incidents of a tax. Put differently, if the import tariff on a good is raised by a 
dollar, then the price of a good in country A (importing country) is likely to rise by 
something short of a dollar. Some of the tariff hike would then be absorbed by the 
exporting firms, which is to say that the export price they receive would be reduced. 
Government B, which cares about the profits earned by its exporters, thus experiences 
a cost when government A selects a higher import tariff. Since government A does not 
internalize the full (worldwide) costs of a higher import tariff, it will set a tariff that is 
higher than would be efficient from a worldwide perspective, where efficiency is 
judged in relation to the objectives of governments A and B. Of course, government B 
views the situation in a symmetrical way, so that the governments in a world without a 
trade agreement have a problem: tariffs are too high.”149 
 
In the WTO legal practice, however, the question of market access is routed in a 
                                            
149 Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger, Petros C. Mavroidis, ”It’s a Question of Market Access”, 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 96, 56 – 76, 2002 
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different way.  
 
In Kodak – Fuji case, it was explicitly contended that “benefits of tariff concessions 
accruing under Article II consist of the legitimate expectation of market access 
opportunities, or improved competitive conditions, for imports created by the tariff 
concessions….” 150 , thus there is an equivalence between “market access” and 
“improved market conditions” here.  
 
In EC – Bananas (AB), the European Communities, in particular, submitted the 
following view, which reflects the general problem in matching “import demand 
curve” in theory with the “improved market conditions” of legal practice. Although, 
the disputed point is connected with the Agreement on Agriculture, it can also be 
viewed within more general terms: “First, the transition from a highly restrictive 
system, largely based on non-tariff barriers, to more open market access for 
agricultural products had to be progressive. Second, the process of reform initiated by 
the Agreement on Agriculture was aimed at achieving binding commitments in three 
areas: market access, domestic support and export competition. The fundamental 
achievement of this reform process was the obligation to remove non-tariff barriers 
                                            
150 Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, Panel Report, WT/DS44/R, 
31 March, 1998  
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and to convert them into tariff equivalents, including tariff quotas”151. 
 
The important issue is raised in this citation: to become a binding agreement, market 
access concept, which is understood, as an import demand, needs to be quantified. 
This kind of “calibration” should be made not only for the agricultural products, since 
in this area this concern is at least partially addressed, but for the majority of 
manufactured goods as well, where the problem is perceived as being solved. The 
current approach in the WTO legal practice, quite to the contrary, is focused on “the 
equality of competitive opportunities”, rather than on quantification of any kind.  
 
This issue was addressed in detail on the very early stage in EC – Oilseeds case: “The 
approach of the CONTRACTING PARTIES reflects the fact that the governments can 
often not predict with precision what the impact of their interventions on import 
volumes will be. If a finding of nullification or impairment depended not only on 
whether an adverse change in competitive conditions took place but also on whether 
that change resulted in a decline in imports, the exposure of the contracting parties to 
claims under Article XXIII:1(b) would depend on factors they do not control; the 
rules on nullification and impairment could consequently no longer guide government 
                                            
151 European Communities – Regime for the importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
WT/DS27/AB/R, 9 September, 1997 
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policies. Moreover, the contracting parties facing an adverse change in policies could 
make a claim of nullification or impairment only after that change has produced 
effects. Such claims could consequently not be made to prevent adverse effects; they 
could only be made to obtain redress ex post. If Article II were considered to be 
protecting expectations on trade flows it would be necessary for the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES to determine what export volumes a contracting party can reasonably 
expect after having obtained a tariff concession. The Panel is not aware of any criteria 
or principles that could be applied to make such a determination. The Panel further 
noted that changes in trade volumes result not only from government policies but also 
other factors, and that, in most circumstances, it is not possible to determine whether a 
decline in imports following a change in policies is attributable to that change or to 
other factors. The provisions of Article XXIII:1(b) could therefore in practice hardly 
be applied if a contracting party claiming nullification or impairment had to 
demonstrate not only that an adverse change in competition has taken place but also 
that the change has resulted in a decline in imports.”152 
  
There is also an interesting elaboration of “market access” concept as provided in 
Japan – Semiconductors153 case. The case as such is concerned with the Agreement 
                                            
152 EC – Oilseeds I (GATT), Report of the Panel, L/6627 – 37S/86, 25 January 1990, para. 151 
153 Japan – Trade in Semiconductors, Report of the Panel adopted on 4 May 1988 (L/6309 - 35S/116) 
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concluded between USA and Japan on 6 November 1986 in order to promote the 
international trade in semiconductors. 
 
The European Communities brought a complaint that the Agreement is exclusionary 
and discriminatory with respect to the third countries. It reads: “The Arrangement 
contains three main sections. The first section relates to market access. It provides 
that the Government of Japan will impress upon the Japanese producers and users of 
semi-conductors the need to aggressively take advantage of increased market access 
opportunities in Japan for foreign-based firms, which wish to improve their actual 
sales performance and position. Specifically, the Government of Japan will provide 
further support for expanded sales of foreign-produced semi-conductors in Japan 
through the establishment of an organization. It will provide sales assistance, quality 
assessment, research fellowship programs, exhibitions, etc., for foreign semi-
conductor producers, and through the promotion of long-term relationship between 
Japanese buyers and foreign producers including joint product development programs. 
On the other hand, the Government of the United States will impress upon the US 
semi-conductor producers the need to aggressively pursue every sales opportunity in 
the Japanese market and will also provide support for the activities of the organization 
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mentioned above.”154 The problem of market access here is addressed from the point 
of actual firms’ behavior: “structural characteristics” of the market prevent advanced 
market access from working if domestic firms engage in certain collaborative 
behavior. In the Arrangement reached upon between the US and Japan on 
semiconductors, probably, the first attempt was undertaken to break the traditional 
conduct of the Japanese firms. International effects of the Arrangement may not be 
perceived as absolutely positive though155. Here the “structural paradigm” of antitrust 
theory is clearly dominating the discussion provided by European Communities. 
 
It also reads: “In relation to monitoring and improvement of market access, MITI 
compiled on a quarterly basis Semi-Conductor Supply-Demand Forecasts. It sent out 
questionnaires to all manufacturers and major users of various semi-conductors to 
seek data on production, demand and other information. Based on the results of those 
surveys, and taking into account information from foreign markets and various 
research organizations, a report was drafted for the deliberation of the Semi-conductor 
Supply-Demand Forecast Committee, composed of users, manufacturers, academics 
                                            
154 The Agreement mentioned in the citation is an Arrangement concerning Trade in Semi-Conductor Pr
oducts concluded between USA and Japan on 6 November 1986 in document L/6076. Japan – Trade in 
Semiconductors, Report of the Panel adopted on 4 May 1988 (L/6309 - 35S/116) 
155 The issue was substantively addressed in the EEC’s complaints, Japan – Trade in Semiconductors, 
Report of the Panel adopted on 4 May 1988 (L/6309 - 35S/116) 
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and experts.  
 
The forecast was formulated as a reference for manufacturers in their production 
schedules. MITI explained its objective to manufacturers and impressed upon them 
the need to reflect real demand in their production. Individual companies were 
expected voluntarily to bring their production almost in line with the forecasts, taking 
into account the appropriate total production. The forecasts were not legally binding 
and the Government did not allocate production volume to individual companies. For 
manufacturers to conspire on production volume was against the anti-trust laws in 
Japan.”156  
 
In fact, the Japanese government had been accumulating data about the real demand 
on semiconductors, which were used for the nation-wide control of production 
volume as well as some tacit coordination with the semiconductors’ producers in the 
United States. The encouraged coordination between American and Japanese 
producers was used to widen US presence in the Japanese market. From the 
perspective of Japanese domestic competition law, the unlawful producers’ behavior 
could have been admitted only in case of direct collusion among them in the 
                                            
156 Japan – Trade in Semiconductors, Report of the Panel adopted on 4 May 1988 (L/6309 - 35S/116) 
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allocation of production volumes. 
 
However, “administrative guidance” of the Japanese government, as an “authorized” 
interference in order to prevent dumping, worked as tool to align production decisions 
as well. In particular, “The Director-General of the Machinery and Information 
Industries Bureau and the Minister of MITI organized meetings with producers and 
exporters (in September 1986, March and May 1987) to request that dumping should 
be avoided.  
 
These requests represented general appeal, not legally binding. The likely 
consequences of disregarding these requests were pointed out. If requests were not 
complied with, they were repeatedly made by MITI.”157 Manufacturers and exporters 
were required to report data on export prices, and periodically on costs to MITI. The 
data collection procedures for prices were established in accordance with Article 67 of 
the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law and Article 10 of the Export 
Trade Control Order. However, non-compliance in this regard would not lead to 
denial of export license or prohibition of exports. The existence or non-existence of 
injury in foreign importing countries was not taken into account by MITI in its 
                                            
157 Ibid 
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monitoring of costs and export prices. Also, MITI could not deny applications for 
export licenses due to inappropriate pricing. 
 
The EEC has formulated the complaint in the following basic points158:  
(1) The sector concerned was one in which Parties to an Agreement (USA and 
Japan) had at the time the dominant position in production and trade, and those 
products (semiconductors) were at the same time of fundamental importance to 
the industrial development of the Contracting Parties concerned (the EEC); 
(2) EEC contended that the monitoring measures applied by the Japanese 
government, especially those vis-à-vis third country markets, contravened the 
provisions of          Articles VI and XI159; 
(3) The provisions on access to the Japanese market included conditions for    
 discriminatory implementation, contravening Article I160; 
(4) The lack of transparency surrounding the whole issue contravened Article 
X161. 
(5) Canada also submitted that in addition to the violations listed above, Article 
                                            
158 Japan – Trade in Semiconductors, Report of the Panel adopted on 4 May 1988 (L/6309 - 35S/116), 
p. 8 
159 Article VI of the GATT-47  – “Antidumping and Countervailing Duties”, Article XI of the GATT – 
“General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions”.  
160 Article I of the GATT-47 – “General Most Favored Nation Treatment”. 
161 Article X of the GATT-47 – “Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations”. 
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XVII:1 (c)162  was violated and EEC agreed with the arguments advanced by 
Canada163.  
 
It is worth noting that the whole formulation of the appeal was accomplished in 
accordance with the “structural view on market access” and supported by the 
hypothesis of collusion between US and Japanese governments and private parties 
they represented. 
 
In general, the EEC stated that the purpose of the Arrangement between USA and 
Japan was clear. “The implementation of the Arrangement had increased prices in the 
US market, thus placing US users at a disadvantage vis-a-vis their competitors in third 
countries and measures to increase prices artificially in those countries were therefore 
taken to the detriment of users in those countries. On the other hand, US producers 
and exporters of semi-conductors would, in the absence of such measures, remain 
                                            
162 Article XVII:1(c) of the GATT –47, “State Trading Enterprises”. It reads: “No contracting party 
shall prevent any enterprise (whether or not an enterprise described in subparagraph (a) of this 
paragraph) under its jurisdiction from acting in accordance with the principles of subparagraph (a) and 
(b) of this paragraph. The principles are of non-discrimination (subparagraph (a)) and purchases and 
sales in accordance with commercial considerations, including price, quality, availability, marketability, 
transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale (subparagraph (b)).  
163 Japan – Trade in Semiconductors, Report of the Panel adopted on 4 May 1988 (L/6309 - 35S/116), 
p. 8 
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exposed to reported Japanese dumping in markets other than the United States.”164 
 
The EEC rejected the explanations given by USA and Japan that the provisions of the 
Arrangement were aimed at the avoidance of dumping in the US market and the 
circumvention of the Arrangement through the markets of third countries. “This 
argument would imply that all contracting parties could apply export controls in 
respect of any product of their choice to all destinations in order to prevent 
circumvention and dumping on any one single market. And they could do so with the 
agreement of only one contracting party, instead of with all parties concerned.”165 
 
In this case EC used the argument that had been extensively used in private antitrust 
litigation, and which implies that there might be controversies between trade and 
competition policies, when it comes to the agreed price settlements between parties 
when one of them threatens to file antidumping investigation against the other. 
 
As Joel Davidow explains: “Issues of antitrust immunity and the GATT law become 
more complex in high-profile trade cases, in which governments take a leading role in 
                                            
164 Ibid: 9 
165 Ibid: 9 
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arriving at restraints on export competition.”166  
 
A case in point, discussed by Davidow, is the settlement of the 1982 steel cases. There, 
US steel companies filed more than 100 dumping and subsidy cases against imports 
from the European rivals. About thirty of the cases were dismissed at early stages due 
to various flaws. Nevertheless, Common Market and US trade officials, advised by 
their industry leaders, decided to negotiate a quota agreement that set quotas, limiting 
European exports to the US of virtually all types of steel, regardless of whether the 
affected steel product was the subject of a pending trade case, a dismissed trade case, 
or no trade case at all. 
 
If such broad agreement had been negotiated among the companies directly, it clearly 
would have failed to pass the antitrust test. Nevertheless, since government officials 
had conducted the case in a manner that brought a waiver from antitrust responsibility. 
Establishing of the case in Japan – Semiconductors by EEC used the same scheme, 
but in the reverse direction.  
 
                                            
166 Joel Davidow “Antitrust Issues Arising out of Actual or Potential Enforcement of Trade Laws”, 
Journal of International Economics and Law, pp. 681-693, 1999. 
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In Japan – Semiconductors, to implement the Third Country Market Monitoring 
provision of the Arrangement between USA and Japan, an export licensing system 
was used for the monitoring, according to which licenses were issued to applications, 
which respected certain price guidelines, i.e. a minimum price fixed for individual 
products. Japan and the United States directly produced, or controlled through 
overseas manufacturing plants, a pre-dominant share of world semi-conductor 
production.  
 
Thus, the government-mandated export price control would have lead to a situation, 
in which importing countries would be forced to pay a price for such imports in 
excess of what normal conditions of competition would imply. This situation could 
have forced, induced or permitted Japanese producers to exercise quantitative export 
limitations, which could have subjected foreign competitors producing competing 
final products to considerable uncertainty and risks in their production plan or even 
prevented them from producing at all. 
 
The Japanese government had also taken steps above and beyond its obligations under 
the Arrangement with the United States in part for the purpose of demonstrating its 
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desire to cooperate with the United States during earlier consultations under the 
Arrangement. 
 
Thus, in November 1986, MITI had invoked the Export Trade control ordinance in 
order to prevent below-cost exports. Thereafter, in January 1987, Japan lowered the 
minimum level for export licenses from 1 million to 50,000 yen. In February 1987, 
Japan increased scrutiny of export license applications for third country exports in 
order to prevent grey market sales. In March 1987, the MITI Minister had convened 
an emergency meeting with the Chairman or President of each of the ten major semi-
conductor companies to impress upon them the importance of avoiding dumping in 
third country markets. 
 
Japan on its own side contended that “the relationship between price supply and 
demand in the semi-conductor industry was characterized by a learning curve effect in 
the sense that an increase in production and productivity brought about a sharp 
decline in costs. In these circumstances, the possible decrease in prices was liable to 
create a high expectation of demand expansion, leading to capacity investment, over-
production and excessive competition over market shares (Dixit competition in 
quantities and then on the second stage in price).  
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These conditions of over-production and excessive competition might have 
promoted a price war and destabilize the balance between demand and supply. On 
the other hand, if low-priced products were exported and regarded as dumped, or if 
low domestic prices prevented an increase in imports of foreign semi-conductors, 
international cooperation might be harmed. MITI's efforts to request manufacturers to 
align their production levels to reflect the real demand and to prevent dumping had 
not had a restrictive effect on exports, but were made with the objective of 
contributing to international co-operation. Here, the economic efficiency concerns 
are obviously disregarded in order to promote international cooperation at the expense 
of global welfare.  
 
From the perspective presented above, the objectives of the Arrangement between the 
US and Japan does not look like an attempt to prevent the deterioration of terms of 
trade for each country. On the contrary, they seem to be aimed at avoiding an 
uncontrolled increase in the market share by one nation at the expense of the other. 
This is especially the case, when diminishing costs marks the production under 
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scrutiny167.  Definitely, “structural competition paradigm” informed the US trade 
authorities to the great extent. Uncontrolled expansion of the one nation’s market 
share at the expense of the other was regarded as “unfair competition” and dumping 
even though the price of semiconductors might have been falling due to rise of 
production efficiency and “learning curve” effects. The increase in market share 
raised concerns about possible future monopolization of the world market with 
subsequent price hikes to the monopolistic level. 
 
The dilemma of international trade in products with diminishing costs curve therefore 
may be characterized as follows. On the one hand, to exercise efficiency gains an 
industry in each particular country is dependent on the other nations’ desire to provide 
access to their domestic markets168. On the other hand, each country is aware that if 
an industry in the other country is faster in reaching the critical volume of production 
its domestic industry can be left behind and deprived of the opportunity to attain 
necessary level of production. As Paul Krugman depicted it “the history of the 
industry matters.” 
                                            
167 Diminishing costs could arise when an industry is characterized by a learning curve, economies of 
scale of various natures, or by significant fix costs of establishing production (natural barriers to entry) 
accompanied by negligible marginal costs of production.   
168 By assumption, domestic market is not deep enough to reach the volume of production necessary for 
exercising economies of scale at full.   
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If that kind of industries exists only in two countries in the world (like in Japan and 
the United States in this case), they can solve this problem through the voluntary 
mutual export restrains 169  or through the combined threat of the imposition of 
antidumping duties and voluntary export restrictions 170 . When proceeding to the 
multilateral setting though, the situation is becoming complicated due to the fact, that 
interests of consumers and producers in the third countries are disregarded. That is 
exactly what happened with EEC in Japan – Semiconductors case.   
 
Within this framework, the basic concern of national governments is not terms-of-
trade Prisoners’ dilemma, since on the contrary the price of the imported good is 
decreasing, while the price of exported good is rising. In this case the problem can be 
characterized by “game-of-timing” in the context of Bertrand-like price competition. 
In non-cooperative setting, each country’s industry would be inclined to over-invest 
into capacity building in order to reach first the threshold of efficient production with 
lowest marginal costs.  
 
                                            
169 In a symmetrical case, when both industries are located at the same point of learning curve or other 
economies of scale.  
170 This is indeed the case Japan - Semiconductors 
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The nature of regulated international trade, however, would generate an impediment: 
higher than necessary import tariffs destined to prevent competitors in other countries 
from attaining a dominant position. The globally efficient production level would not 
be touched. Unilateral free trade would induce a price war (Bertrand-like competition) 
and unproductive dissipation of resources. Negotiating of reciprocal concessions on 
non-discriminatory basis would not solve the problem, however, since the “game-of-
timing” issue persists. Market access would be nullified or impaired as soon as the 
industry in one country would manage to reach the efficiency threshold first.  Product 
differentiation has a potential to alleviate the dilemma.             
 
If we alleviate the assumption that a domestic industry can reach productive 
efficiency contingent upon the access to foreign markets, the situation will complicate. 
The incentive to invoke “infant industry argument” would emerge in different 
countries in accordance with the size of their domestic markets. If a domestic market 
were large enough to achieve an efficiency threshold, a country would have an 
aptitude to block the access of its foreign competitors. If the development of this 
industry is contingent upon the access to foreign markets, it is unlikely to rise without 
international cooperation.  
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When it is allowed for imperfectly competitive markets with implicit “game-of-
timing”, a common international agreement on competition for all industries is 
implausible, since every industry is characterized by its own form of marginal costs 
curve as well as the necessary volume of fixed costs.    
 
Japan in Japan – Semiconductors case contended that since production costs 
decreased sharply as a result of the learning curve effects, and since most semi-
conductors had a short life span, manufacturers tended to attempt to recoup their 
investments quickly by expanding production. They normally set price levels taking 
into account anticipated levels of supply and demand at a future period of time. This 
meant that typically the cost at the targeted production point would be lower than the 
current cost since a downward cost curve was expected.  
 
Consequently, sales prices, though not intended, could possibly be found to be below 
cost. This problem involved some basic issues related to the method of calculating 
costs when long-term pricing practices of high-technology goods with rapid 
technological innovation were involved. In addition, it was observed that unit cost 
became higher as production decreased. Therefore, when a producer decreased his 
production, he was likely to set higher prices to reflect the higher production cost. 
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Thus, it was not abnormal that semi-conductor producers set higher prices in the 
process of adjusting production in accordance with the principle of profit 
maximization.171 
 
The Japan – Semiconductors is particularly interesting, since in this case the 
competition policy concerns were addressed in the context of “market access” 
analysis.   
    
In a communication to the members of the WTO Group on the Interaction between 
Trade and Competition Policies, the United States Government pointed out the 
following probable link: “We can observe a graduate evolution in trade policy toward 
a broader understanding of the potential impediments to market access. This evolution 
looks beyond broader barriers such as tariffs in order to secure other meaningful 
improvements in market access conditions, by turning attention to the range of 
barriers that affect conditions of competition in the market and that may restrict the 
ability of foreign firms to effectively operate in the given market.”172 
 
                                            
171 Japan – Trade in Semiconductors, Report of the Panel adopted on 4 May 1988 (L/6309 - 35S/116) 
172 WTO, “Communication from the USA to the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and 
Competition Policy”, WT/WGTCP/W/66, March 26, 1998 
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In sum, when we try to consider trade perspectives and tools in their entirety, we can 
observe that they are all built on the basis of nation-state concept, in which private 
parties are represented by their respective governments. This is the main reason why 
theoretically the broad competition policy agenda is not sustainable and even 
superfluous with respect to trade policy promoted by the government. When, however, 
we consider commitment approach, proposed by Maggi, the situation becomes 
different: private parties and government engage in certain relationship that affects the 
outcome for the whole trading system. The tools used by the world trading system are 
imperfect. Negotiation, renegotiation with equivalent withdrawal of concessions and 
retaliation are unable to solve the problem of enforcement. May be that makes the 
alternative Cordato approach more promising? Figures 4-11 are illustrating trade 
perspectives and trade tools. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Current world trading system is full of controversies. The complex of tools used for 
its consolidation (non-discrimination and reciprocity) and support (renegotiation and 
retaliation) are unable to make it sustainable enough. The major force that presses 
governments to abide is of psychological nature and connected to the inherent fear of 
total breakdown of international cooperation. 
 
The interaction between trade and competition policies may be regarded as one of the 
fundamental issues of current system. The analysis shows that many provisions in the 
WTO Agreements and approaches of the Parties in dispute settlement practices are 
deeply rooted in “structural competition” approach to the antitrust theory, which 
showed itself as theoretically well-developed but relying too much on mentally 
constructed benchmarks such as “perfect competition”, “competitive markets” and 
“free trade”. 
 
Economists working in neoclassical settings have constantly been trying to find an 
objective rationale for existing world trading system and partly succeeded in that, but 
their analysis came to the general conclusion that nothing should be changed in the 
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present system. All problems can be totally solved through enhancing flexibility of the 
working mechanisms. The reality does not generally align with their view. 
International competition for trade is multi-dimensional and contravene with the view 
that globally optimal level of market access could be reached exclusively through 
determining sovereign tariffs. Even much older “import discipline” hypothesis allows 
for that. 
 
In this regard the introduction of elements of international framework on investments 
and “action rights” allowing incorporation of dynamic competition might serve as an 
alternative road to reforming the WTO system. 
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